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ABSTRACT
Do members of the House of Representatives have a constitutional
right to resign their seats? This Article uses that question as a window
onto broader issues about the relationship between legislators and
citizens and the respective roles of liberalism and republicanism in the
American constitutional order. The Constitution explicitly provides
for the resignation of senators, presidents, and vice presidents, but,
curiously, it does not say anything about resigning from the House of
Representatives. Should we allow the expressio unius interpretive
canon to govern and conclude that the inclusion of some resignation
provisions implies the impermissibility of resignation when there is no
such clause? Or should we consider this a meaningless variation?
This Article examines how members left (or were prevented from
leaving) the House of Commons, the colonial American legislatures,
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the early state legislatures, and the Continental Congress and
concludes that the background assumption at the Founding was that
legislative seats could not be resigned. Moreover, the available
evidence from the Constitution’s drafting shows that the Founders
understood there to be a difference between the House and Senate
with regard to resignation. The Article presents several reasons, based
on the different institutional designs and functions of the two houses,
why this might have been the case, including different term lengths
and methods of appointment and the early Senate’s role as a quasiambassadorial body. From this historical evidence, the Article
suggests that the House has the power to prevent its members from
resigning.
However, the House of Representatives has never exercised this
power. After surveying the debates over resignation in the early
Congresses, the Article concludes by considering policy reasons for
requiring members to get the House’s permission to quit their seats.
Specifically, the Article offers two paradigm cases for returning to the
original understanding: the first case deals with members who wish to
resign while they stand accused of ethical transgressions; the second
case deals with members who wish to leave because legislative service
has ceased to be convenient for them. The Article argues that both
cases point toward the need for a return to a previous, more
republican, understanding of resignations.
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INTRODUCTION
Does a member of the United States House of Representatives
have a constitutional right to resign? The question is deceptively
simple—we are, after all, accustomed to seeing members resign all the
1
time. But despite explicitly providing for the resignations of
2
3
4
senators, the president, and the vice president, the Constitution’s
text nowhere provides for the resignation of a member of the House
5
of Representatives. A straightforward application of the expressio

1. There are a number of recent examples. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Representative Quits,
Pleading Guilty in Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at A1 (noting the resignation of Randy
Cunningham); Monica Davey, Lawmaker Guilty of Manslaughter; Says He’ll Resign, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A1 (noting the resignation of Bill Janklow); Michael Grunwald, DeLay
Pulls No Punches in Final Speech to House, WASH. POST, June 9, 2006, at A3 (noting the
resignation of Tom DeLay); National Briefing Washington: Congressman Resigns over Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2006, at A13 (noting the resignation of Bob Ney); Hans Nichols, Ballance
Resigns from Seat, HILL (Wash., D.C.), June 9, 2004, at 3 (noting the resignation of Frank
Ballance); Christi Parsons & Rick Pearson, Hastert Farewell Urges Civility, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16,
2007, at C3 (noting the resignation of Dennis Hastert); Dave Wedge, Meehan Move Leaves
‘Power Vacuum’ in State Delegation, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 14, 2007, at 6 (noting the
resignation of Martin Meehan); Kate Zernike & Abby Goodnough, Lawmaker Quits over Email Sent to Teenage Pages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at A1 (noting the resignation of Mark
Foley).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (providing for the appointment of a replacement senator
when “Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise”).
3. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same
shall devolve on the Vice President . . . .”); id. amend. XXV, § 1 (“In case of the removal of the
President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become
President.”).
4. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“[T]he Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President . . . .”).
5. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (“When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State,
the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”).
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unius canon of interpretation, then, would seem to leave us at odds
with everyday practice. Surprisingly, this fact has received almost no
7
attention at all, either in the scholarly literature or in congressional

6. “Expressio unius” is short for “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”—the canon that
holds that the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN,
A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 88–91 (2007) (describing the canon’s
background and application); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 304–33 (6th ed. 2000) (same). So, for example, when a parent tells a child who
is ogling a table full of desserts that the child may have one cookie and one brownie, it is
understood to imply that the child may not also have two pieces of pie and a cupcake. Or, to
take the question this Article considers, the inclusion of provisions for the resignation of some
government officials can be read to imply that officials for whom no such provision exists may
not resign.
7. Professor Currie, in his magisterial Constitution in Congress series, devotes less than a
footnote to the issue of whether members of the House can resign. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 135 n.41 (1997)
(suggesting merely that there is “no plausible reason for treating the two chambers differently in
this regard”). Other scholars who study constitutional congressional procedure have given the
issue of resignation even less attention. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P.
FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 189–227 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing constitutional
requirements for serving in Congress, but not for leaving it); ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE,
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 465–593 (2d ed. 2002) (same); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 935–57 (4th ed. 2005)
(discussing ballot access but not resignation); Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth
of the Citizen-Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 650 n.81 (1996) (noting in passing that the
opportunity costs of running for political office are reduced because a successful candidate “can
always resign to take advantage of [other] opportunities if they become sufficiently attractive”);
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361,
386–437 (2004) (making no mention at all of the issue of resignation). Indeed, Lexis and
Westlaw searches turn up a number of mentions of members who have resigned (or threatened
to do so) but nothing about the constitutional issues raised by resignation.
There is a substantial political science literature on why members leave Congress and
what they do next, but this literature, too, is wholly inattentive to the constitutional issues
surrounding resignation from the House. Instead, it generally treats resignation as raising the
same issues as retirement (that is, the decision not to run for another term)—it treats both as if
they involve only issues of when and why members choose to leave the House. See, e.g., JOHN
R. HIBBING, CHOOSING TO LEAVE: VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT FROM THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES passim (1982) (discussing retirement without mentioning resignation’s
constitutionality); JOHN R. HIBBING, CONGRESSIONAL CAREERS: CONTOURS OF LIFE IN THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 23–24 (1991) (providing detailed statistical analyses of the
career paths of members of the House without ever discussing the constitutionality of
resignation); DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE,
JAMES MADISON THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH 129–67 (2000) (discussing postcongressional
political ambition without mentioning the constitutionality of resignation); Allan G. Bogue et
al., Members of the House of Representatives and the Processes of Modernization, 1789–1960, in
1 THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT, LEADERSHIP, AND
INTERNAL STRUCTURE, 1789–1989, at 21, 40–42 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1991) (combining
resignation, acceptance of federal appointment, running for another office, and election to the
Senate into a single category of “voluntary termination” for the purposes of analysis); Charles S.
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procedure manuals. Expressio unius is by no means an ironclad rule,
Bullock, III, House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition, 66 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1295, 1297–99 (1972) (discussing why career representatives leave the House without
mentioning resignation’s constitutionality); Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane & Antonio
Merlo, A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347–49
(2005) (discussing congressional career spans without mentioning constitutional issues
surrounding resignation); Morris P. Fiorina, David W. Rohde & Peter Wissel, Historical Change
in House Turnover, in CONGRESS IN CHANGE: EVOLUTION AND REFORM 24 passim (Norman
J. Ornstein ed., 1975) (discussing congressional career spans without mentioning resignation);
Stephen E. Frantzich, Opting Out: Retirement from the House of Representatives, 1966–1974, 6
AM. POL. Q. 251, 251–54 (1978) (discussing representatives’ decisions to retire but failing to
differentiate retirement from resignation); Richard L. Hall & Robert P. van Houweling, Avarice
and Ambition in Congress: Representatives’ Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House, 89
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 121, 121–22 (1995) (developing a rational choice–based model of when
members voluntarily leave the House without discussing the constitutionality of resignation);
Rebekah Herrick & David L. Nixon, Is There Life After Congress? Patterns and Determinants of
Post-Congressional Careers, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 489, 489–90 (1996) (analyzing
postcongressional careers without discussing the constitutionality of resigning to pursue such
careers); D. Roderick Kiewiet & Langche Zeng, An Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions,
1947–1986, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 928, 928–29 (1993) (discussing the factors influencing
members’ decisions on whether to leave their seats without ever mentioning the
constitutionality of resignation); David L. Leal, Home Is Where the Heart Is: Congressional
Tenure, Retirement, and the Implications for Representation, 30 AM. POL. RES. 265, 271–72
(2002) (discussing postcongressional lobbying careers without mentioning the constitutionality
of resigning to pursue such careers); Harvey D. Palmer & Ronald J. Vogel, Political
Opportunity for Federal Appointment: The Case of Departing Members of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 1961–1992, 57 J. POL. 677, 685–86 (1995) (discussing motives for congressional
resignations without mentioning the constitutionality of those resignations); Douglas Price,
Careers and Committees in the American Congress: The Problem of Structural Change, in 2 THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT, LEADERSHIP, AND
INTERNAL STRUCTURE, 1789–1989, supra, at 385, 395 tbls.1–4 (noting the number of House
resignations in several Congresses, but providing no analysis of these numbers); H. Douglas
Price, The Congressional Career: Then and Now, in CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR 14, 16–19
(Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971) (noting only the frequency with which House members have left to
run for other offices).
8. See WM. HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO
THE RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE § 23-4, at 484–85 (2003) (noting
the procedure for resigning without considering its constitutionality); CLARENCE CANNON,
CANNON’S PROCEDURE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 489 (1963) (noting that a
resignation, once tendered, cannot be withdrawn—this is the only section mentioning
resignation in the manual); LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, LEX PARLIAMENTARIA AMERICANA:
ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 50, 186, 196 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 9th ed. 1874) (asserting, without any
analysis or supporting evidence, that representatives may refuse to serve and that resignation
creates a vacancy in all American legislative bodies); FLOYD M. RIDDICK, CONGRESSIONAL
PROCEDURE 13 n.41 (1941) (devoting less than a footnote to the issue of resignation from the
House); CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE,
RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE (1989) (making no mention at all of resignation);
Thomas Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice, in CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, WITH THE AMENDMENTS THERETO: TO WHICH ARE ADDED
JEFFERSON’S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, THE STANDING RULES AND ORDERS
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but this hitherto overlooked difference in wording between the
House and Senate Vacancies Clauses should at least provide the
starting point for further inquiry. This is all the more so because this
issue also has implications extending far beyond the resignability of
House seats, raising important questions about the interplay between
liberal and republican values in the American constitutional order.
9
Whatever the differences amongst republican theorists, I take
them to share at least two common principles. First, in Machiavelli’s
10
words, the “laws make [people] good.” That is, the laws—which
should be taken to mean not merely formal statutes and decisions, but
also the more informal norms that constitute the governance of a
polity—both educate citizens to desire to act in virtuous ways and
11
constrain them from acting badly. And second, political actors have
an obligation to act in furtherance of the public good rather than
12
simply to pursue their own private ends. The first principle suggests

CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES, AND BARCLAY’S DIGEST 43 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1861)
(same).
9. And there are, indeed, significant differences. For an attempt to catalogue the various
republicanisms, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1564–
76 (1988).
10. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES, 112 (bk. I, ch. 3) (Bernard Crick ed.,
Leslie J. Walker trans., Penguin Books 1998) (1531).
11. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 136–37 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that, in
republican theory, the task of the legislator is to eliminate the citizenry’s corrupt “second
nature” to allow for the restoration of its intrinsically good primal nature); id. at 284–85
(describing how the institutional arrangements of the Venetian city state “mechanized virtù”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 39 (1985)
(identifying “education and inculcation of virtue” as “traditional republican means” of
governance).
12. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 10, at 275 (bk. II, ch. 2) (“[I]t is not the well-being of
individuals that makes cities great, but the well-being of the community; and it is beyond
question that it is only in republics that the common good is looked to properly in that all that
promotes it is carried out . . . .”); POCOCK, supra note 11, at 75–76 (noting that service of the
public good, rather than private interests, is crucial to a republican polity’s survival); id. at 201
(“The republic is the common good; the citizen, directing all his actions toward that good, may
be said to dedicate his life to the republic . . . .”); id. at 249–50 (“[O]nore is a form of civic virtù;
it is attained in serving the common good, and in pursuing it and its concomitant values above
all others, we are proclaiming the supremacy of the common good.”); Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18
(1986) (describing republicanism as oriented around the subordination of private ends to public
ones); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. REV. 543, 551 (1986) (“Republicanism, unlike liberalism, exalts the good of the whole
over the good of its individual members. Where liberalism finds the primary purpose of
government to be promotion of the diverse goods of its individual citizens, republicanism finds
FOR
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the importance of leadership by example—that is, the obligation of
those in power to educate others in civic virtue by demonstrating
their own commitment to virtuous behavior. The second principle
suggests a stark contrast with a liberal, interest-group theory of
politics. The republican does not believe that the common good is
promoted as an unintended byproduct of individuals’ pursuit of their
private goods. Rather, the public good is independent and must be
13
pursued independently by citizens and rulers alike. In short,
republican theory suggests that those in power have an obligation
both to behave virtuously, by putting the public good ahead of their
own private ends, and to promote virtue in the citizenry by being seen
to act virtuously.
Drawing on republican theory, this Article suggests that there
are good reasons for treating resignation from the House as a matter
of congressional grace rather than one of constitutional right. Under
the interpretation suggested here, a member’s resignation would not
become effective until accepted by a vote of the House, and, in
certain limited circumstances, the House would be justified in
refusing that acceptance.
Part I of this Article traces the history of procedures used for
leaving the British House of Commons. Although these procedures
have changed over the centuries, they have never included
resignation as a legal right; moreover, at the time of the American
Founding, it was not always the case that a member who wished to
leave the House of Commons would be able to do so. Part II shows
that this understanding carried over into preconstitutional American

its primary purpose to be definition of community values and creation of the public and private
virtue necessary for societal achievement of those values.”); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1550
(“[I]n their capacity as political actors, citizens and representatives are not supposed to ask only
what is in their private interest, but also what will best serve the community in general—
understood as a response to the best general theory of social welfare.” (footnote omitted)).
13. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
606–08 (rev. ed. 1998) (opposing the classical republican conception of a polity bound together
by social structure and a unity of interests with the modern liberal conception of competing
interest groups vying for public advantage); Michelman, supra note 12, at 21 (“Republicanism
contests with a so-called pluralist vision, which regards the political system as, ideally, designed
to serve the self-defined private interests of individuals or groups, fairly represented in political
forums, where they compete under fair rules for fair shares of the outputs of public policy.”);
Philip Pettit, Reworking Sandel’s Republicanism, 95 J. PHIL. 73, 95 (1998) (book review)
(contrasting republicanism with interest-group pluralism); Suzanna Sherry, Republican
Citizenship in a Democratic Society, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1988) (book review)
(contrasting “the liberal focus on communities as aggregations of individuals” with “the
republican focus on individuals as members of communities”).
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practice. Neither the colonial legislatures, nor the pre-1789 state
legislatures (with a single exception), nor the Continental Congress
under the Articles of Confederation recognized an individual’s right
to resign. Part III shows that the available evidence from the drafting,
ratification, and early commentary on the Constitution strongly
suggests that the founding generation, too, had this understanding in
mind. Specifically, this Part shows that the difference in wording
between the House and Senate Vacancies Clauses was intentional,
and it demonstrates that there are good structural reasons for treating
the two chambers differently. Part IV traces the deviation from this
interpretation, beginning in the Second Congress and continuing to
the present day. Part V, however, offers two paradigm cases for
returning to the original meaning. These cases—one of which deals
with members who wish to leave the House while they stand accused
of ethical transgressions and the other of which deals with members
who wish to leave because legislative service is simply no longer
convenient for them—both suggest that a turn toward a more
republican conception of legislative service would be valuable.
I. LEAVING THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
A. Before the Chiltern Hundreds
In 1624, there were three candidates for the two parliamentary
seats for the County of Gloucester: Robert Poyntz, John Dutton, and
14
Sir Thomas Estcourt. Estcourt “declared openly” that he was voting
for his rivals, “as not desiring the place for himself, but praying to be
15
spared.” He was, however, returned for one of the seats, and the
election was challenged in the House of Commons’ Committee of
16
Privileges and Elections. The first question addressed by the
17
committee was “[w]hether Sir Thomas Estcourt was eligible, against
18
his own consent, and contrary to his desire.” The committee
concluded that he was eligible because

14. JOHN GLANVILLE, REPORTS OF CERTAIN CASES DETERMINED AND ADJUDGED BY
COMMONS IN PARLIAMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST AND TWENTY-SECOND YEARS OF THE
REIGN OF KING JAMES THE FIRST 99 (London, Baker & Leigh 1775).
15. Id. at 100.
16. Id. at 99.
17. The committee also inquired into reports of polling irregularities in Gloucester, see id.
at 101–03, but that inquiry is not relevant for this Article.
18. Id. at 101.
THE

CHAFETZ.DOC

2008]

10/31/2008 1:22:57 PM

LEAVING THE HOUSE

185

no man, being lawfully chosen, can refuse the place; for the country
and commonwealth have such an interest in every man, that when,
by lawful election, he is appointed to this public service, he cannot,
by any unwillingness, or refusal, of his own, make himself incapable;
for that were to prefer the will, or contentment, of a private man,
before the desire and satisfaction of the whole country, and a ready
way to put by the sufficientest men, who are commonly those, who
19
least endeavour to obtain the place.
20

The House accepted its committee’s conclusion, and Estcourt took
his seat.
This strident assertion of republican obligation, in the face of
countervailing personal inclination, was hardly new in 1624. Indeed,
the idea that members of Parliament were obligated to serve dated
back to the institution’s inception. Parliament’s origins lie in the
21
medieval curia regis, the king’s council; as a body meant to assist the
22
Crown, the king naturally had an interest in its composition. As
Professor Kemp has noted, “[p]ermission to be excused from serving
the king in parliament was a privilege which the king was seldom
23
willing to grant.” She identifies only illness, royal service overseas,
24
and captivity as grounds for resignation. When the king sought
25
advice from a subject, the subject was bound to deliver it.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 103.
21. See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY 22 (1999) (“The first parliaments were meetings of the King and his tenants-inchief, in which he sought their counsel, consent, and material support in discharging his
principal responsibilities, the defence of the realm and the dispensation of justice within it. The
acts of those parliaments were acts of the King, and their authority was his authority, fortified
by counsel and consent.”); CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT
AND ITS SUPREMACY: AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN LEGISLATION
AND ADJUDICATION IN ENGLAND 14–38 (1910) (tracing the development of Parliament).
22. See JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND
DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 145–47 (2007) (noting
that royal officials settled parliamentary election controversies until the late-sixteenth century).
23. Betty Kemp, The Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, in ESSAYS PRESENTED TO SIR
LEWIS NAMIER 204, 205 (Richard Pares & A.J.P. Taylor eds., 1956).
24. Id. at 205 n.1.
25. See 1 EDWARD PORRITT, THE UNREFORMED HOUSE OF COMMONS: PARLIAMENTARY
REPRESENTATION BEFORE 1832, at 239 (2d ed. 1909) (noting the Crown’s punishment of
members who withdrew from Parliament without leave in 1554); see also A.F. POLLARD,
FACTORS IN MODERN HISTORY 107 (1907) (noting that, under the Tudors, “[p]arliamentary
representation was an irksome duty; men could no more resign a seat in Parliament than they
can to-day resign their obligation to serve on juries or pay rates and taxes”).

CHAFETZ.DOC

186

10/31/2008 1:22:57 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:177

During Elizabeth’s reign, the House of Commons began
successfully to assert exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions
26
about its own composition, including jurisdiction to determine
27
whether a member would be permitted to resign. The House,
however, proved no more willing to excuse its members from service
than the Crown had—it allowed resignations only for sickness or
28
other public service, and sometimes not even for those. In
November 1605, two members sought leave to resign. John Hassard, a
member for Lyme Regis, insisted that he was unable to serve “by
29
Reason of the Gout.” The Committee of Privileges reported that
30
Hassard came before them and that he “walked in Fear only.” The
31
committee nevertheless recommended “[t]hat he should serve still,”
32
and the House agreed. (The precise reasons for refusing to allow
Hassard to leave the House at this point are unclear, but the
committee may have concluded that he simply was not sick enough to
get out of his obligations.) Indeed, he remained in the House until
1609, when his constituents petitioned the House to allow him to
33
resign. The committee found that he was “incurable—bed-rid,” and
34
he was finally allowed to leave the House. However, on the same
day in 1605 that Hassard first sought to resign his seat, William
Swaddon, the member for Calne, asked to be excused on the grounds
that he was “[w]eak, and not able to serve, by Reason of Age, and not

26. See CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 145–47 (discussing the House of Commons’ vigorous
and successful assertion of its right to judge disputes over the elections and qualifications of its
members during the controversies surrounding the 1580 elections and the 1586 Norfolk
election).
27. See Kemp, supra note 23, at 205 (“During Elizabeth’s long parliament (1572–83) the
House successfully claimed that it alone could authorize both the resignation of members and
the issue of writs for by-elections to replace them.”).
28. Id. at 206.
29. 1 H.C. JOUR. 257 (Nov. 9, 1605).
30. Id. I take this to mean that only the fear of the House’s displeasure induced him to
leave his sickbed.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 3 T.H.B. OLDFIELD, THE REPRESENTATIVE HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
IRELAND: BEING A HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AND OF THE COUNTIES, CITIES,
AND BOROUGHS, OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 372 (London,
Baldwin, Cradock & Joy 1816).
34. Id.
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35

likely to recover.” The committee recommended that he be excused,
36
and the House allowed him to resign.
In addition to illness, the holding of other offices sometimes
justified departure from the House. In 1606, at the beginning of a
parliamentary session, the Lord Chancellor sent the Speaker of the
House of Commons a list of seven members who had been appointed
37
to royal offices since the previous parliamentary session. On the
advice of the Committee of Privileges, three of the members were
excused from service and four were made to keep their parliamentary
38
seats. (The excused members were those who had been appointed to
royal offices with life patents; the unexcused members were not
39
appointed “for Life.” ) Indeed, even the holding of an office legally
incompatible with parliamentary service did not guarantee permission
to resign. In 1629, John Lynn sought permission to leave the House,
40
having been elected mayor of Exeter. The House concluded,
however, that, “being a Member of the House before he was elected
41
Mayor, he ought to serve here,” and give up the mayoralty.
This was the milieu in which Thomas Estcourt was required to
serve against his own wishes. Parliamentary service, which began as a
royal duty, had become a republican one. This republican spirit
continued for the rest of the seventeenth century. In 1641, George
Abbott, who had been returned for the borough of Guildford in
42
Surrey, requested that he be allowed to “decline his Election; and
43
that a new Burgess be chosen to serve in his Stead.” The Journal of
the House of Commons notes tersely, “The Motion was not thought
44
fit to be granted.” After the Restoration, the standards for
resignation seem to have loosened—in 1677, a member-elect was

35. 1 H.C. JOUR. 257 (Nov. 9, 1605).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 315–16 (Nov. 19, 1606).
38. Id. at 323–24 (Nov. 22, 1606).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 920 (Jan. 20, 1629). The House of Commons forbade simultaneous service as a
mayor and as a member of Parliament. See id. at 246 (June 25, 1604) (resolving that “no Mayor
of any City, Borough, or Town corporate, should be elected, returned, or allowed to serve as a
Member of this House”).
41. Id. at 920 (Jan. 20, 1629).
42. Abbott’s first name and constituency can be found in 1 U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS,
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT: PARLIAMENTS OF ENGLAND, 1213–1702, at 494 (London, Hansard
1878).
43. 2 H.C. JOUR. 201 (July 6, 1641).
44. Id.
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allowed to “disclaim and renounce his Election” without any reason
45
specified in the Journal. Importantly, however, this resignation was
not of right: the Journal makes a point of noting that “the House
46
allowed thereof.” (It should also be noted that members-elect could
47
refuse to take the necessary oaths and thereby disqualify themselves.
This method of refusing a seat was unavailable, however, to a
member who wished to resign a seat he already occupied or a
member-elect who was uncomfortable refusing to swear the Oaths of
Supremacy and Allegiance.)
In the early eighteenth century, however, a series of statutes that
were intended to limit the Crown’s power over Parliament had the
unintended consequence of creating new possibilities for leaving the
House.
B. Statutory Incompatibility Provisions
In 1701, as it became clear that neither the widowed King
William III nor his successor, Princess Anne, would have any heirs,
Parliament passed the Act of Settlement to ensure that a clear line of
succession would prevent the Crown from falling back into the hands
48
of the Catholic Stuarts. In addition to providing for the Crown to
pass to the House of Hanover, the Act created several limitations on
49
royal power to take effect when both William and Anne were dead.
One such limitation was the provision that “no Person who has an
Office or Place of Profit under the King or receives a Pention from
the Crown shall be capable of serving as a Member of the House of
45. 9 H.C. JOUR. 402 (Mar. 19, 1677).
46. Id.
47. See 2 JOHN HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 79
(photo. reprint 1971) (London, Hansard, 4th ed. 1818) (reporting the occurrence of this practice
in the 1689 Monson and 1698 Archdale cases).
48. Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2. (1701).
49. Id. § 3 (noting that these provisions were necessary to secure “our Religion Laws and
Liberties from and after the Death of His Majesty and the Princess Ann of Denmark”). The Act
of Settlement can be understood as a second bill of rights. In the first Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W.
& M., c. 2, Parliament conditioned granting the Crown to the House of Orange on significant
limitations on royal power. The very idea that the Crown was the Parliament’s to grant is seen
as definitively establishing parliamentary supremacy in the English Constitution. See
GOLDWORTHY, supra note 21, at 159–60; COLIN R. MUNRO, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 128 (2d ed. 1999). Just as the 1689 Parliament gave the House of Orange a choice between
a Crown reduced in power and no crown at all, so the 1701 Parliament gave a similar choice to
the House of Hanover. This explains why the limitations were not to take effect until both
William and Anne were dead—had the Act attempted to limit royal power immediately, it
might well have been denied royal assent.
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Commons.” The goal was to prevent undue royal influence over
Parliament, but the means employed were too crude—the provision
would have prevented even secretaries of state from serving in the
House of Commons, a radical alteration of the traditional theory of
English government, which had no strict principle of separation of
powers and in which ministers of the Crown were frequently drawn
51
from the House.
Before that provision of the Act of Settlement could come into
52
effect, it was repealed by the 1705 Regency Act. In its place, the Act
excluded from the House of Commons anyone holding one of an
enumerated list of Crown offices, anyone holding a Crown office
created after 1705, or anyone holding a pension at the pleasure of the
53
Crown. Moreover, any member of the House of Commons who
accepted “any Office of Profit from the Crown during such Time as
he shall continue a Member” voided his election; however, so long as
the office was not one of those enumerated, he could stand for
54
reelection to the House of Commons. If reelected, he could hold
55
both positions. (Members who served in the army or navy and
56
received a promotion did not, however, void their elections. ) These
provisions were to come into effect at the end of the Parliament that
57
passed them —under the Triennial Act, that could be no later than
58
59
1708. In 1707, these provisions were repassed, essentially verbatim.

50. Act of Settlement, c. 2, § 3.
51. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD’S ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY, FROM THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME 467 (11th ed. 1960) (“[Z]eal
had outrun discretion in the Act of Settlement, which seemingly would have excluded even such
place-holders as Secretaries of State or the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That rule would have
given us a strict separation of executive and legislative organs such as still exists in the United
States.”).
52. Regency Act, 1705, 4 & 5 Ann., c. 20, § 28.
53. Id. § 29.
54. Id. § 30.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 32.
57. Id. §§ 29–30.
58. See Triennial Act, 1694, 6 & 7 W. & M., c. 2, § 3 (providing that no Parliament could
last longer than three years).
59. See 6 Ann., c. 41, §§ 24–27 (1707). The 1705 Regency Act, like the 1701 Act of
Settlement, was primarily concerned with the succession to the English Crown. In 1707, the Act
of Union with Scotland, 1707, 6 Ann., c. 11, created the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The
1707 Regency Act was passed to address the same issues with respect to the British Crown. As
the union raised no new issues with regard to incompatibility, those provisions were simply
repeated with only minor and inconsequential alterations in wording.
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Apparently impatient for the incompatibility rules to come into
effect, the House of Commons resolved to enforce them in the
60
present Parliament, and a number of members were shortly
61
thereafter declared incompatible.
62
By 1715, at the latest, members had figured out that they could
use the incompatibility provisions as a means of giving up their seats.
This is well illustrated by a series of events between 1715 and 1717.
On November 21, 1715, Richard Onslow accepted the royal office of
teller of the exchequer, thereby vacating his seat in the House of
63
Commons, where he represented the County of Surrey. His
appointment as teller of the exchequer was a compensation for being
forced out of the chancellorship of the exchequer, a position that he
64
held for about a year. Teller of the exchequer was a substantial
65
sinecure, and there is no indication that he accepted the position
66
solely for the purpose of leaving his seat. He had also been promised
a peerage, although he waited until the next year to take out his
67
patent. However, on the same day that Richard Onslow accepted the
68
tellership, his son, Thomas Onslow, also vacated his seat in the
House, where he represented Bletchingly , by becoming “Out Ranger
69
of his Majesty’s Forest of Windsor.” (Rangers were royal officials
whose job it was to patrol the edges, or “purlieus,” of forests and

60. 15 H.C. JOUR. 396 (Nov. 10, 1707).
61. See, e.g., id. at 420 (Nov. 12, 1707) (ordering the issuance of new writs of election for six
members declared incompatible by operation of the new rules).
62. See Kemp, supra note 23, at 207 (“It is not possible . . . to say definitely how many of
the eighty or so members who lost seats [during the first half of the eighteenth century] as a
result of appointment to office used their offices for the purpose of quitting their seats.”).
63. 18 H.C. JOUR. 328 (Nov. 21, 1715).
64. 2 ROMNEY SEDGWICK, THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1715–1754, at 310 (1970).
65. See 5 EVELINE CRUICKSHANKS, STUART HANDLEY & D.W. HAYTON, THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS, 1690–1715, at 36 (2002) (describing the tellership as “lucrative”).
66. See id. (noting that “his evident dismay at losing the [chancellorship] was to some
degree alleviated” by the tellership).
67. Onslow apparently waited to take out his patent to avoid the appearance of
impropriety:
[H]aving been a member of the House of Commons committee whose report had led
to the impeachment of the heads of the late Tory Government, he was reluctant to
take out his patent until the impeachments were out of the way, so that ‘they who had
been accusers might not sit as judges in the same cause.’ After some months, owing to
the delay in trying Lord Oxford, he compromised by taking out his patent and
abstaining from voting on anything relating to the impeachments.
2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 310–11.
68. Id. at 311.
69. 18 H.C. JOUR. 328 (Nov. 21, 1715).
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drive back into the forest any deer that might seek to explore life in
70
the larger world. The out ranger was likely a ranger who did not live
in—and therefore, did not actually patrol—the forest for which he
71
was responsible. The job was thus an office without responsibilities.)
72
Although this office came with a large sinecure, Thomas also viewed
it as a means of vacating his seat, as he immediately stood for and was
73
elected to his father’s old seat in Surrey. In 1717, his father, who by
74
then had accepted his peerage, died. Thomas Onslow was now Lord
Onslow, thus making him a member of the House of Lords and
requiring that a new writ be issued for a representative of Surrey in
75
the House of Commons. Five days later, Richard’s uncle, Denzil
76
Onslow, who represented Guildford in the House of Commons,
vacated his seat by accepting the post of out ranger of Windsor
77
78
Forest. Denzil then stood for and was elected to the Surrey seat.
Surrey was clearly a more desirable seat for members of the
Onslow family—it was a county seat, whereas Bletchingly and
79
Guildford were both borough seats, and county seats had long been
80
81
more prestigious. The family thus used its royal connections to get
70. See JOHN MANWOOD, MANWOOD’S TREATISE OF THE FOREST LAWS 313–15 (William
Nelson ed., London, Nutt, 4th ed. 1717). This job may sound silly, but it must be remembered
that, although the Crown did not own all of the land in the forest, it did own all of the beasts of
the forest. See 6 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 2, para. 1149 (Viscount Hailsham ed., 2d
ed. 1932). The ranger thus served to ensure that the king’s venison did not wander away.
71. See 10 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1001 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “out-” as
“[i]n the sense, ‘Living, residing, or engaged outside (a house, hospital, borough, city, country,
etc.)’, usually as distinguished from those of the same body or class living, residing, etc., within”
and giving “out-ranger” as an example). The fact that Thomas Onslow was simultaneously a
member of Parliament for Surrey, see infra text accompanying note 73, and the out ranger of
Windsor Forest strengthens this interpretation. It seems unlikely that he was sitting in the
House of Commons by day and chasing deer by night.
72. 5 CRUICKSHANKS ET AL., supra note 65, at 39.
73. Id.; 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 311.
74. 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 310–11.
75. 18 H.C. JOUR. 658 (Dec. 13, 1717).
76. Denzil Onslow (c. 1642–1721) was a younger son of Sir Richard Onslow (1601–64).
Denzil’s older brother Arthur was Sir (later Lord) Richard Onslow’s (1654–1717) father. See 5
CRUICKSHANKS ET AL., supra note 65, at 18–40; 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 309–12.
77. 18 H.C. JOUR. 660 (Dec. 18, 1717).
78. 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 309–10.
79. See 5 CRUICKSHANKS ET AL., supra note 65, at 18–40.
80. See, e.g., J.E. NEALE, THE ELIZABETHAN HOUSE OF COMMONS 313 (1949) (noting that
in each of the ten instances of fathers and sons sitting together in the 1571 parliament, “the
fathers sat for their county and the sons for boroughs, mostly within the county”); LAWRENCE
STONE & JEANNE C. FAWTIER STONE, AN OPEN ELITE? ENGLAND 1540–1880, at 241 (1984)
(“Borough MPs could often buy their seats or intimidate the electorate. The position of Knight
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Thomas and Denzil appointed to an insignificant office that, by virtue
of the incompatibility clauses, vacated their seats, thus allowing them
to stand for the Surrey seat when it became available. Other members
seem to have learned from the Onslows, and a number of others
82
vacated seats in similar manners between 1715 and 1750.
C. The Chiltern Hundreds
Beginning in the 1750s, royal stewardships—principally, the
stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds—came into use as the primary
means of vacating House seats. The three Chiltern Hundreds of
83
Stoke, Desborough, and Burnham, in Buckinghamshire, were royal
84
properties at least as early as the reign of Edward I. The Hundreds
were administered by a steward, an office of profit under the Crown,
85
appointed in the exchequer. By the eighteenth century, the office
had ceased to carry any administrative functions, nor was it any
86
longer a source of measurable profit. It was still formally an office of
87
profit under the Crown, however, and therefore holding it triggered
88
the statutory incompatibility rule.
In 1751, the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds was first used
as a means of leaving the House. On the same day that two seats in

of the Shire [that is, the holder of a county seat], on the other hand, was at the choice of the
leading squires and nobility of the county . . . .”); E.A. Wasson, The Penetration of New Wealth
into the English Governing Class from the Middle Ages to the First World War, 51 ECON. HIST.
REV. (n.s.) 25, 30 (1998) (noting that members of the English landed elite served as “shire
knights if possible and borough members if necessary”).
81. See 5 CRUICKSHANKS ET AL., supra note 65, at 36 (noting Richard Onslow’s “strong
position at court”); id. at 39 (noting the “favour of the new King [George I]” bestowed upon
Thomas Onslow and his subsequent favor with George II).
82. See Kemp, supra note 23, at 208 (noting the likely use of several other Crown offices
for the purpose of leaving House of Commons seats in the first half of the eighteenth century).
83. For a map of the Chiltern Hundreds, see U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE,
THE CHILTERN HUNDREDS app. A (2008), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/
upload/p11.pdf.
84. 3 ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 100 (E.A. Jelf ed., 3d ed. 1938).
85. Id.
86. Id.; U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, supra note 83, at 3.
87. See 2 HATSELL, supra note 47, at 55 n.§ (recognizing that the stewardship is formally an
office of profit, but suggesting that only longevity of use prevents one from questioning whether
any profit in fact accrues to the steward).
88. The logistics of holding the stewardship are simple: a member applies to the chancellor
of the exchequer for the office. If it is granted, the member’s seat in the House is immediately
vacated. The member continues to hold the stewardship until the next appointment to the
stewardship, which revokes the patent of the previous officeholder. See U.K. HOUSE OF
COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, supra note 83, at 2.
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Dorchester were declared vacant, John Pitt vacated his seat in
90
Wareham by accepting the Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds.
He promptly stood for and was elected to one of the vacant
Dorchester seats. The next year, we find the first instance of a
member using a stewardship to retire altogether. Henry Lascelles,
who represented Northallerton, vacated that seat by accepting “the
Office of Chief Steward and Keeper of the Courts of the Honour of
Berkhamstead, and of the Manor, Lordship, and Town of
91
Berkhamstead,” a post similar to the stewardship of the Chiltern
Hundreds. His son, Daniel, stood for and was elected to his old seat,
92
and Henry Lascelles died the next year. In 1753, Henry Vane, who
represented Durham, was elevated to the peerage, thus vacating his
93
seat. The same day, his son (also named Henry) accepted the
stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, thus vacating the seat for
94
Downton. The younger Vane immediately stood for and won his
95
father’s old seat. And in 1757, William Pitt the Elder accepted the
stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds (much as his cousin John had
96
done six years earlier), thus vacating the seat for Okehampton,
97
which he had held for only about seven months. Pitt had just become
prime minister, and he took the opportunity to switch constituencies
to Bath, his second home and a seat that he would not have to work
98
very hard to retain.
89. See 26 H.C. JOUR. 5 (Jan. 18, 1751) (noting vacancies created by Nathaniel Gundry’s
acceptance of a justiceship on the Court of Common Pleas and by John Browne’s death).
90. Id.
91. 26 H.C. JOUR. 497 (Mar. 17, 1752).
92. 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 199–200.
93. 26 H.C. JOUR. 805 (May 4, 1753).
94. Id.
95. 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 64, at 491.
96. 27 H.C. JOUR. 926 (July 1, 1757).
97. See 1 BASIL WILLIAMS, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM 290 (1913)
(noting that Pitt stood for the Okehampton seat in December 1756, having vacated his previous
seat of Aldborough by becoming secretary of state).
98. Id. at 323–24 & 324 n.1. Pitt did not automatically vacate his seat upon becoming prime
minister because the position of prime minister was then unknown to the law—from a legal
standpoint, the prime minister was simply a secretary of state, an office that Pitt had already
held when elected to the Okehampton seat. See F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 396 (photo. reprint 1963) (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1908) (noting that, “to this
day the law knows no such person” as a prime minister). The prime minister was not mentioned
in a statute until 1917. See O. HOOD PHILLIPS ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 358 (8th ed. 2001). Because Pitt’s legal status as a Crown officer had not changed, his seat
was not vacated under the 1705 and 1707 acts. See supra text accompanying note 55. Thus, to
switch seats in 1757, Pitt had to apply for and receive the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds.
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By the end of the 1750s, accepting a stewardship had become the
usual way of leaving the House of Commons, and the Chiltern
99
Hundreds quickly became the stewardship used for this purpose.
Indeed, it is still the case that members may resign only by accepting a
100
Crown stewardship, and “Chiltern Hundreds” has passed into
101
common parlance. As is the case with all Crown powers of the type
102
that Bagehot labeled “efficient,” the power of granting the Chiltern
Hundreds now actually resides with the ministry of the day—in this
103
case, it resides with the chancellor of the exchequer.
Crucially, however, the granting of the Chiltern Hundreds
remained discretionary for quite some time. Indeed, the Chiltern
Hundreds “were regarded, like other patronage, as something to
104
which the opponents of the Government had no claim.” Thus, in
1774, when Nathaniel Bayly, who had opposed the government on
sensitive issues dealing with the increasingly rebellious American
105
colonies, sought the Chiltern Hundreds in order to stand for a
different seat, Lord North (who was, at the time, both chancellor of

99. See Kemp, supra note 23, at 208–10 (noting the growing use of the stewardship in the
second half of the eighteenth century).
100. In contemporary Britain, the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds and the
stewardship of the Manor of Northstead are granted alternatingly to members who wish to
resign. For a list of members who accepted these offices between 1970 and 2008, see U.K.
HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, supra note 83, at app. B.
101. See, e.g., G.K. CHESTERTON, ALARMS AND DISCURSIONS 155–59 (1910) (describing
the author’s fantasy of running for Parliament, taking the Chiltern Hundreds, and then
demanding to exercise the duties of the office); 1 ANTHONY TROLLOPE, PHINEAS FINN, THE
IRISH MEMBER 39–42 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1868) (telling the story of Phineas Finn, a
young member of Parliament, contemplating taking the Chiltern Hundreds); Editorial, A Celeb
for All Seasons, TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2006, at 21 (noting member of Parliament George
Galloway’s performance on the Big Brother reality television show and suggesting that
“[p]erhaps Celebrity [Big Brother] is the modern equivalent of the Chiltern Hundreds for [the]
Respect [Party],” of which Galloway is the most high-profile member); Andrea Felsted,
Chairman Norris Castigated for Jarvis ‘Shambles’, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 15, 2004, at 21
(reporting on an investigator telling the chairman of the Jarvis company that the chairman
“could not be trusted with the Chiltern Hundreds, let alone with Jarvis”).
102. See WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 7–11 (Miles Taylor ed., New
York, Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1867) (differentiating the dignified, or ceremonial, aspects of
the Constitution from the efficient, or functional, aspects, and locating the dignified aspects in
the Monarch and the efficient aspects in the government of the day).
103. 3 ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 100.
104. 1 PORRITT, supra note 25, at 245.
105. See 2 LEWIS NAMIER & JOHN BROOKE, THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1754–1790, at 67–
68 (1964) (noting Bayly’s history of siding with the parliamentary opposition, including on
matters of America policy).
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the exchequer and prime minister) simply refused. North again used
the Chiltern Hundreds for partisan advantage in 1779, when John
Glynn died, thus necessitating a by-election for his seat in Middlesex.
Two members of the House sought the Chiltern Hundreds in order to
stand for the Middlesex seat; North granted it only to the member
107
sympathetic to the government, and he was returned for Middlesex.
Indeed, the Chiltern Hundreds were denied as late as the midnineteenth century. The 1841 elections were marked by allegations of
bribery, leading to petitions challenging the seating of the returned
108
members. To escape investigation by a parliamentary committee,
members struck “corrupt compromises,” under which they agreed to
apply for the Chiltern Hundreds and not run in the resulting byelections; in return, the challengers, who would then stand for the
109
seats unopposed, would withdraw their petitions. After several of
these “compromises” had been effectuated, the government caught
on, and Viscount Chelsea’s application for the Chiltern Hundreds, as
110
part of a corrupt compromise, was denied. Since 1775, efforts have
been repeatedly made to introduce a regularized system of
withdrawal from the House of Commons, but they have consistently
111
been defeated.
In short, resignation from the House of Commons has always
been a concept foreign to British law. Parliamentary service was seen
first as a royal duty, then as a republican one. Since the early
eighteenth century, members have been able to leave the House by
accepting a royal office of trust or profit. Since the middle of the
eighteenth century, the primary office used for this purpose has been
the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds. However, for a long time,
the Chiltern Hundreds were not granted as a matter of course. And
even when taking the Chiltern Hundreds later became common, it
was seen as necessary to preserve the principle that leaving the House
of Commons was a matter of grace. Indeed, during the crucial period
of American constitutional development, the British practice was
clear: no member had a right to resign from the legislature.
106. 18 WILLIAM COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 416–18 (London,
Hansard 1813); 1 PORRITT, supra note 25, at 245–46.
107. 1 PORRITT, supra note 25, at 247.
108. Kemp, supra note 23, at 212.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 213.
111. See Betty Kemp, Resignation from the House of Commons, 6 PARLIAMENTARY AFF.
211, 214–15 (1952) (summarizing the history of such attempts).
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II. PRECONSTITUTIONAL AMERICAN PRACTICE
A. Colonial Practice
Evidence on how members left American colonial legislatures is
scant, but the available information suggests that colonial
representatives had no more right to resign their offices than did
members of the House of Commons. As a general matter, the
colonial assemblies tended to model themselves after the House of
Commons, especially on matters relating to their privileges and
112
procedures. As Professor Greene has noted, colonial legislators
looked to English sources for “a whole set of generalized and specific
institutional imperatives for representative bodies, a particular
pattern of behavior for their members, and a concrete program of
113
political action.”
Thus, for example, a 1706 Pennsylvania law provided an
automatic fine for “any person or persons so chosen and returned to
serve . . . [who] shall be absent from the service for which he or they
shall be so elected . . . unless his or their excuse for such absence shall
114
be allowed of by the Assembly.” Note that the fine applies to
anyone “chosen and returned”—that is, anyone “elected.” It does not
seem to have mattered whether or not the person wanted to serve.
Indeed, the same act provided for a by-election whenever “any
person so chosen and returned . . . shall happen to die or be willfully
absent, or by vote of the House be disabled to sit or serve in
115
Assembly.” In other words, the statute recognized the possibility
that legislators might willfully absent themselves from their duties,
and it accordingly provided a means for replacing them. But so far
was this from a right to resign that it also made such behavior
fineable.
Similarly, a 1715 North Carolina law provided that

112. See J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 31 (1971) (noting that colonial “[a]ssemblies adopted for themselves the
theory of the British House of Commons and modelled [sic] themselves on its precedents and
procedures”).
113. JACK P. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 197 (1994).
114. Act to Ascertain the Number of Members of Assembly and to Regulate the Election,
1705/06, reprinted in 2 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
1164, 1167 (W. Keith Kavenagh ed., 1973) (emphasis added).
115. Id.
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whatsoever representative, so elected as aforesaid, shall fail in
making his personal appearance and giving his attendance at the
Assembly precisely at the day limited by the writ or on the day
appointed for the meeting of the biennial Assembly . . . shall be
fined for every day’s absence during the sitting of the Assembly,
unless by disability or other impediment to be allowed by the
Assembly, twenty shilling, to be seized by a warrant from the
116
Speaker.

Again, note that the fine was for anyone who had been elected
and failed to appear. Refusal of the seat would have to be “allowed
by the Assembly” if the member did not wish to be fined. A Maryland
law of the same year provided fines for any “elected” delegates who
failed to “attend at the time and place of the meeting of such
assembly, . . . unless upon sufficient excuse to be admitted by the
117
house of delegates their absence be dispensed with.”
A 1683 New York law provided for by-elections in the case of
118
“death or removal of any of the said representatives” —those
apparently being the only means contemplated of vacating a seat. A
1721 South Carolina statute provided for by-elections if a legislator
“should die or depart this province, or refuse to qualify him or
themselves as in this act directed, or be expelled by the said House of
119
Commons.” Refusal to qualify meant refusal to take the requisite
120
oath —thus, a member of the South Carolina House of Commons,
121
like a member of the British House of Commons, could refuse a
seat by refusing to take the oath. But members who had already
taken the oath, or members who felt honor bound to swear that they
were “duly qualified to be chosen and serve as a member of the

116. Act Relating to the Biennial and Other Assemblies and Regulating Elections and
Members in North Carolina (1715), reprinted in 3 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA,
supra note 114, at 2009, 2010.
117. Act Directing the Manner of Electing and Summoning Delegates and Representatives
to Serve in Succeeding Assemblies and for Ascertaining the Expenses of the Councilors,
Delegates of Assembly, and Commissioner of the Provincial and County Courts of this Province
(1715), reprinted in 2 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, supra note 114, at 1030, 1031.
118. Charter of Liberties and Privileges of the Inhabitants of New York and Its
Dependencies, October 30, 1683, reprinted in 2 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, supra
note 114, at 1051, 1052.
119. Act to Ascertain the Manner and Form of Electing Members to Represent the
Inhabitants of This Province in the Commons House of Assembly, 1721, reprinted in 3
FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, supra note 114, at 1980, 1982–83.
120. See id. at 1982 (noting that each person must be qualified before swearing an oath).
121. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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Commons House of Assembly . . . according to the true intent and
122
meaning of this act,” would have no way of vacating their seats.
New Jersey seems to have had a similar rule. In 1770, John
Ogden, a member of the colonial legislature from Essex, had to sell
all of his property to pay his debts, thus putting him below the
123
property requirement for legislative service. He thus sought and
124
received permission from the house to resign. The house’s granting
him permission to resign, however, “was disputed by the governor
and council on the ground that the resignation of a member had no
precedent in parliament, while the house insisted that this made no
difference as the decision of such questions lay wholly with the
125
representatives.” We thus see a clash between the parliamentary
126
privilege of each house to regulate its own composition and the
127
Crown’s stance that only it could excuse a legislator from service.
Importantly, however, no one claimed that the decision was Ogden’s
alone.
It should be noted that the New Jersey Assembly had good
reason to think that it, rather than the governor or council, should be
the authority to allow or deny a member’s request to give up his seat.
128
It is true, as we have seen, that the power of granting the Chiltern
Hundreds to members of the House of Commons lay with the
chancellor of the exchequer, a Crown official. And it is true that the
122. Act to Ascertain the Manner and Form of Electing Members to Represent the
Inhabitants of This Province in the Commons House of Assembly, 1721, reprinted in 3
FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, supra note 114, at 1980, 1982.
123. MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN
COLONIES 166 (1943).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 166–67.
126. See CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 144–61 (tracing the history of parliamentary
jurisdiction over election and qualifications disputes); POLE, supra note 112, at 505 (“Each
colonial Assembly made itself in the image of the British House of Commons. It quickly
established control over that vital factor, its own composition, claiming as the Commons had
done under James I the power to judge the credentials of its own members.”).
127. Here, the royal governor and his council stood as the Crown’s representatives, much as
the chancellor of the exchequer did in granting the Chiltern Hundreds. Colonial legislatures, it
should be noted, had incompatibility rules similar to those in place in Britain. See, e.g., JACK P.
GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE SOUTHERN
ROYAL COLONIES, 1689–1776, at 187–89 (1963) (noting the exclusion of certain royal
officeholders (“placemen”) from the colonial assembly in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia);
ELMER I. MILLER, THE LEGISLATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF VIRGINIA: ITS INTERNAL
DEVELOPMENT 56 (1907) (“As a rule a burgess could not hold any other office during his term
as burgess.”).
128. See supra Parts I.B–C.
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colonial governor and council were also appointed by the Crown. But,
129
as we have also seen, by the mid-eighteenth century, Crown officers
130
were in fact answerable to Parliament. Members of Parliament who
wished to leave the House thus sought permission from someone
answerable to the House. Colonial governors, however, were not
131
responsible to colonial legislatures. Allowing Crown officials to
interfere in the composition of colonial legislatures thus violated the
hard-won parliamentary privilege of a house to regulate its own
132
composition in a way that allowing Crown officials (who are in fact
answerable to the House) to interfere in the composition of the
House of Commons does not. Thus colonial—and, as we shall soon
see, state and national—legislatures asserted that they had the right
to determine when and how their members could leave their seats.
B. State Practice, 1776–1789
The states in the formative years between independence and the
drafting of the federal Constitution tended to follow the same
practices as their colonial predecessors. The 1776 Pennsylvania
Constitution provided for filling legislative “vacancies” by “certain
133
and regular elections,” without specifying how those vacancies
could come about. It specifically provided, however, that members of
134
135
the supreme executive council, executive and judicial officers, and
136
justices of the peace could resign. The omission of any mention of
resignation for legislators, when it was specifically provided for in the

129. See supra text accompanying notes 102–03.
130. See MAITLAND, supra note 98, at 395–96 (noting that the principle of common
ministerial responsibility to Parliament dates from the Walpole administration (1721–42)); see
also MUNRO, supra note 49, at 56 (“Every Prime Minister since Walpole has been a member of
either the House of Commons or the House of Lords, and we may say that there is another well
established convention to that effect, which has ensured that governments have been
responsible to Parliament.”).
131. See POLE, supra note 112, at 29 (“[T]he Governor, whether royal or proprietary, stood
not only as the ‘executive’ in a ‘mixed’ form of government but represented an interest and a
point of view that were not based in the colony in which he held his appointment.”); see also id.
at 529 (“The monarchical element [in the colonies] was provided by the presence and very real
power of the royal Governor—or the proprietary one, in Pennsylvania . . . .”).
132. See CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 144–61; see also supra text accompanying notes 26–27.
133. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 6, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES 3083 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1906) [hereinafter THORPE].
134. Id. art. II, § 19, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3086–87.
135. Id. art. II, § 20, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3087–88.
136. Id. art. II, § 30, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3089.
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case of so many other offices, raises a strong presumption that it was
137
not permitted for legislators, a presumption strengthened by the
138
background British practice.
Indeed, an incident surrounding the calling of the Pennsylvania
convention to ratify the proposed federal Constitution lends further
support to the idea that resignation was impermissible in the
Pennsylvania Assembly. On Friday, September 28, 1787, George
Clymer introduced in the Pennsylvania Assembly a series of
139
resolutions calling for a ratification convention. The timing of the
resolutions was important, as the third and final session of the
Eleventh General Assembly of Pennsylvania was due to expire the
140
next day, and a new assembly would be elected the next month. The
first resolution, which expressed the Assembly’s general desire to call
a convention, was considered the morning it was introduced and
141
passed by a vote of forty-three to nineteen. The Assembly then
adjourned until that afternoon without voting on the second
resolution, which specified the date and procedures for electing
142
delegates to the convention. When it reconvened, the nineteen
members who voted against the first resolution did not attend, and
143
the Assembly was left one member short of a quorum. The
144
Assembly sent its sergeant at arms to “collect the absent members,”
145
but they refused to appear. The next day, another member refused
146
to attend, leaving the Assembly two members short of a quorum.
The sergeant, accompanied by a clerk, was sent out to find the absent
members, and, with the aid of private citizens, forcibly brought two of
147
them to the legislative chambers. One of the forcibly detained
members, James M’Calmont, sought permission to be excused from

137. See supra note 6 (discussing the expressio unius canon of interpretation).
138. See supra Part I.
139. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 65–66
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
140. Id. at 54.
141. Id. at 66–67.
142. Id. Herrington speculates that it adjourned for lunch in what he terms “an inexplicable
parliamentary blunder.” Matthew J. Herrington, Popular Sovereignty in Pennsylvania, 1776–
1791, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 575, 603 (1994).
143. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 139, at 95.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 96–97 (reciting the dialogue between the Speaker and the sergeant).
146. Id. at 103.
147. Id. at 103–04, 110 n.1.
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149

the House, but, after lengthy debate, it was “determined almost, if
150
not quite, unanimously, in the negative.” With a quorum thus
assembled, the Assembly passed the resolution calling the ratifying
151
convention.
A quorum of the Pennsylvania Assembly consisted of “two152
thirds of the whole number of members elected” —that is, the
153
denominator would remain the same even if a seat were vacant.
Given that the Assembly was to be dissolved the next day, a member
would have had nothing to lose by resigning, and a resignation, if
effective, would have prevented the quorum that M’Calmont and
others sought to prevent. Yet resignation was never even mentioned
as a possibility, strongly suggesting that it simply was not an option.
Resignation, like a temporary withdrawal from the Assembly,
required the permission of the Assembly, permission which was
unlikely to be forthcoming in those circumstances.
Like the Pennsylvania Constitution, the 1776 Virginia
Constitution provided that each house of the legislature should issue
154
writs for filling “intermediate vacancies,” without specifying what
could cause those vacancies. However, the document also explicitly
provided for filling vacancies caused by resignation in the case of
155
judges, court clerks, the secretary of state, and the attorney general,
156
again giving rise to an expressio unius–type argument.
The 1778 South Carolina Constitution allowed the legislative
157
houses to issue writs for legislative vacancies “occasioned by death.”
Moreover, it directed the houses to set specific days for filling
vacancies created if “any parish or district shall neglect to elect a

148. See id. at 104.
149. See id. at 104–09.
150. Id. at 109.
151. Id. Professor Ackerman concludes from all this that “[t]he threads of political
legitimacy were visibly beginning to unravel.” 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 56 (1998). Although a full discussion of that point is beyond the scope of
this Article, it should be apparent from what has been said thus far that forcing unwilling
members to attend was an acceptable and accepted part of legislative procedure.
152. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, § 10, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3085.
153. For a discussion of the denominator problem in quorum rules, see generally John
Bryan Williams, How to Survive a Terrorist Attack: The Constitution’s Majority Quorum
Requirement and the Continuity of Congress, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025, 1037–67 (2006).
154. VA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, para. 27, reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3816.
155. Id. art. II, paras. 35–36, reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3817.
156. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
157. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3253.
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member or members on the day of election, or in case any person
chosen a member of either house shall refuse to qualify and take his
158
seat as such, or die, or depart the State.” Additionally, holding
certain state offices and service as a religious minister were made
159
incompatible with service in the legislature.
None of these
provisions, it should be noted, encompasses the resignation of a seat
already held. Again, this omission is particularly telling in light of the
160
explicit provision for the resignation of the governor.
The 1777 New York Constitution had no provision at all for
filling legislative vacancies. It did, however, provide for filling
vacancies occasioned by the resignation of the governor or lieutenant
161
governor. Similarly, the 1777 Vermont Constitution allowed the
162
filling of vacancies created by the resignation of state “officers” but
163
said nothing about filling legislative vacancies. The 1786 Vermont
Constitution allowed for the replacement of “officers” whose
164
positions were vacant because of “death or otherwise” but still said
nothing about filling legislative vacancies.
Most of the remaining early state constitutions neither said nor
implied anything about resigning from the state legislature. Some had
provisions for filling vacancies without any suggestion as to how those
165
vacancies could come about;
others had both vacancy and
incompatibility provisions but did not suggest what else might lead to
166
such vacancies; still others had vacancy provisions whose scope was
167
unclear.

158. Id. art. XIX.
159. Id. arts. XX–XXI.
160. Id. art. VIII, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3249.
161. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. XX–XXI, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at 2633.
162. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 2, § XVIII, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3745.
163. It is clear that “officers” does not apply to members of the General Assembly. See id.
ch. 2, § XX (“Every officer of State, whether judicial or executive, shall be liable to be
impeached by the General Assembly . . . .”).
164. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 2, § 11, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 133, at 3756.
165. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 5, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 133, at 563.
166. See GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. VII, XVII, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 133, at 779,
780; N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. X, XXV–XXXIII, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 133, at
2790–91, 2792–93. New Jersey had only an incompatibility provision—and an odd one at that. It
provided that anyone holding an executive or judicial office had to give it up upon election to
the legislature, rather than vice versa. See N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XX, reprinted in 6 THORPE,
supra note 133, at 2598.
167. See MASS. CONST. of 1780 pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, art. IV, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note
133, at 1897 (providing for the filling of “all vacancies in the senate, arising by death, removal
out of the state, or otherwise”). The Massachusetts Constitution also has an incompatibility
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One state, however, did allow its legislators to resign. The 1776
Maryland Constitution provided that
on refusal, death, disqualification, resignation, or removal out of this
State of any Delegate, or on his becoming Governor, or member of
the Council, a warrant of election shall issue by the Speaker, for the
election of another in his place; of which ten days’ notice, at least,
(excluding the day of notice, and the day of election) shall be
168
given.
169

Another clause allowed for the resignation of state senators. It
is important to note that the Maryland Constitution was explicit
about the possibility of legislative resignation. Given that a right to
resign from the legislature would have been novel at English law and
does not seem to have existed in the colonies or the other states, it
170
would have to be spelled out explicitly for it to exist at all.
C. Practice in the Continental Congress under the Articles of
Confederation
The understanding that legislators had no individual right to
resign seems to have carried over into the Continental Congress as
well. The Articles of Confederation provided for a unicameral
Congress to which each state could send between two and seven
171
172
members. Each state, however, had only one vote, and delegates’
173
salaries and expenses were to be paid by their state. The delegates
were “annually appointed, in such manner as the legislature of each
174
state shall direct,” and the state could, at any time, recall a delegate
175
and send another in his stead. Moreover, no one could serve as a

clause. Id. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. II. The New Hampshire Constitution, which was patterned on the
Massachusetts, contained an identical vacancy provision. See N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 2, para.
14 (Senate), reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 133, at 2460.
168. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. VII, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 133, at 1692.
169. Id. art. XIX, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 133, at 1694.
170. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 925 (1992) (arguing that interpretation does and should favor continuity over change
in legal regimes and that a clear legislative statement is needed to overcome the presumption in
favor of continuity).
171. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, para. 2 (U.S. 1781).
172. Id. art. V, para. 4.
173. Id. art. V, para. 3.
174. Id. art. V, para. 1.
175. Id.
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delegate for more than three years in any six-year period. The
Articles were, however, silent on the question of members’
resignations.
Service in the Continental Congress does not seem to have been
177
an altogether pleasant experience, and the Congress frequently had
trouble mustering the quorum of seven states required to transact
178
business. There did seem to be a general belief, however, that
members had no right to absent themselves, even if the Congress had
trouble enforcing that principle. In 1786, a congressional committee
reported that, “a delegate having taken his seat in Congress, has no
right to withdraw himself without permission obtained either from
179
Congress or the state he represents.” That provision of the
committee’s report was not agreed to by the Congress, with five states
180
voting for it, three voting against, and four states divided. It should
be noted, however, that of the thirty delegates voting, eighteen voted
181
affirmatively and twelve negatively. It thus seems fair to say that a
substantial majority of the delegates believed they had no right to
182
withdraw.

176. Id. art. V, para. 2.
177. See JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 220 (1979) (noting the “persistent turnover” in the
Congress and attributing it to the fact that members “disliked the burdens Congress imposed
and preferred to be at home”).
178. Id. at 355 (“From the time of its retreat to Princeton until the very demise of the
confederation, Congress struggled almost constantly to maintain the quorum of seven states
required by the Articles.”).
179. 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 408 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934).
180. Id. at 409.
181. Id.
182. It should also be noted that the Continental Congress was, in important ways, very
different than the House of Commons, the colonial legislatures, or state legislatures. The
“United States” created by the Articles of Confederation was more akin to “an alliance, a multilateral treaty of sovereign nation-states” than it was to a nation-state. AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 25 (2005). Naturally, the Congress under such a
scheme played a very different role than a national or subnational legislature would. Id. at 27. It
has been noted both that the Continental Congress “acted less as a legislature than as an
executive council,” id. at 57, and that it had more in common with the General Assembly of the
modern United Nations than with the American Congress under the Constitution, see
CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 165. It is possible that those delegates who voted against the
provision to prohibit withdrawing simply did not see themselves as members of a legislature like
the House of Commons or state or colonial assemblies and therefore did not understand their
conduct to be governed by the rules that governed such bodies.
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The behavior of elected delegates further supports this
observation. As Professor Rakove has noted,
The republican values of the Revolution did not permit
conscientious leaders casually to reject an appointment to office
merely because it was inconvenient. Republicanism not only
glorified the individual who risked private interest for the public
weal, it also bestowed on the act of election the sovereign imprint of
183
the popular will.

Indeed, quite a number of delegates served in the Continental
184
Congress against their wishes. Those who did wish to resign in the
middle of their service had to “ask leave to Retire,” as North
185
Carolina delegate John Williams did in 1779.
*

*

*

We have thus seen that preconstitutional American legislatures,
with only one exception, followed the British rule that legislative
service was a duty and that it therefore could not be resigned as a
matter of right. The one exception we have seen—in the Maryland
state constitution—was explicitly spelled out, probably precisely
because it was understood to be exceptional. We have also seen that,
as this practice made its way across the Atlantic, it altered subtly.
Rather than seeking permission from Crown officials to resign,
American colonial legislators sought permission from their houses.
After the Revolution, it continued to be sought, not from state
governors, but from legislative houses. And, as the next Part argues,
this was the scheme envisioned under the Constitution, as well.
III. THE CONSTITUTION
The Constitution provides that, “[w]hen vacancies happen in the
[House] Representation from any State, the Executive Authority
186
thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.” In
contrast, “if Vacancies happen [in the Senate] by Resignation, or
otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the
Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next
183. RAKOVE, supra note 177, at 232; see also id. at 233 (“Attendance at Congress was thus
an obligation to be discharged, not an ambition to be fulfilled.”).
184. See id. at 232–36 (discussing a number of such delegates).
185. Id. at 234.
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4.
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Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.”
The word “resignation” is used in describing the creation of vacancies
188
in the presidency and vice presidency, as well. The text of the House
Vacancies Clause is silent about resignations; the question for the
interpreter, then, is how pregnant a silence this is.
A. Drafting and Ratification
The Philadelphia Convention did, in fact, consider constitutional
language that would have given representatives a right to resign.
Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph, a member of the Committee of
189
Detail, produced a “draft sketch” of a constitution, which provided
for filling “[v]acancies [in the lower house of the legislature caused]
190
by death disability or resignation.” For the Senate, the sketch simply
191
provided a placeholder reading “Vacancies,” presumably because it
was intended to be identical to the provision for the lower house.
Randolph’s sketch, including this wording, was taken up by the
192
Committee of Detail, but that was the last time in the Convention
that this wording appeared. Several subsequent drafts in the
Committee of Detail mentioned vacancies in the House of
Representatives without suggesting how those vacancies could arise
193
and said nothing at all about Senate vacancies.
The draft reported by the Committee of Detail to the full
Convention provided that “[v]acancies in the House of
Representatives shall be supplied by writs of election from the
executive authority of the State, in the representation from which it
194
shall happen,” and that “[v]acancies [in the Senate] may be supplied
195
by the Executive until the next meeting of the Legislature.” There

187. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
188. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (president); id. amend. XXV, § 1 (same); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (vice
president).
189. This sketch is reproduced in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 183–93 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).
190. Id. at 185.
191. Id. at 186.
192. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 137, 140, 142 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
193. See id. at 154–55, 164–65.
194. Id. at 179.
195. Id.
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was no mention of how those vacancies might arise. The Convention
196
unanimously agreed to the provision for filling House vacancies.
The provision for filling Senate vacancies, however, was
somewhat more contentious. James Wilson objected to the provision
allowing governors to fill vacancies when the state legislature was not
197
in session, but he was voted down. Hugh Williamson proposed a
provision that would allow state legislatures to create their own
procedures to fill Senate vacancies during state legislative recesses,
198
but he, too, was voted down. There then followed a telling colloquy
between James Madison and Gouverneur Morris:
Mr. Madison in order to prevent doubts whether resignations could
be made by Senators, or whether they could refuse to accept, moved
to strike out the words after “vacancies”. & insert the words
“happening by refusals to accept, resignations or otherwise may be
supplied by the Legislature of the State in the representation of
which such vacancies shall happen, or by the Executive thereof until
the next meeting of the Legislature”
Mr. Govr. Morris[:] this is absolutely necessary. otherwise, as
members chosen into the Senate are disqualified from being
appointed to any office by sect. 9. of this art: it will be in the power
of a Legislature by appointing a man a Senator agst. his consent, to
199
deprive the U.S. of his services.
200

Madison’s proposal then passed unanimously. Thus amended,
201
the provision was accepted by the Convention, and these provisions
were not discussed again. At the end of the Convention, the
Committee of Style cleaned up the wording, such that the House
provision read, “When vacancies happen in the representation from
any state, the Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election
202
to fill such vacancies.” The Senate provision read, “[I]f vacancies
happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the
Legislature of any state, the Executive thereof may make temporary
196. Id. at 231.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 231–32.
199. Id. at 232 (footnotes omitted). This passage is Farrand’s reconstruction, combining
elements of Madison’s notes and the Convention’s journal. I have omitted the brackets
indicating which passages come from which sources.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 233.
202. Id. at 591.
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appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature.” The House
204
provision is unchanged in the Constitution except for capitalization.
The words “which shall then fill such Vacancies” were added to the
205
end of the Senate provision, which is otherwise unchanged except
206
for capitalization.
Note that both Madison and Morris understood it to be
necessary (“absolutely necessary,” in Morris’s words) to explicitly
provide for the resignation of senators; otherwise, they might be
unable to quit their seats. Indeed, Morris even understood the
incompatibility provision to run against executive office holding—that
is, instead of appointment to executive office automatically vacating
the Senate seat, holding a Senate seat would make someone ineligible
for appointment to executive office. This seems especially troubling,
both because of the length of a senator’s term and because of the
method of his appointment—a state legislature could, without a
person’s consent, prevent his appointment to, say, a cabinet position
by appointing him to the Senate instead.
There was also concern about a related problem—members of
Congress resigning to accept executive positions that had been
207
created (or made more lucrative) during their time in Congress.
George Mason argued that members should be ineligible to hold such
positions until they had been out of Congress for at least a year;
otherwise, “evasions may be made. The legislature may admit of
208
resignations and thus make members eligible” for executive office.
That is, without an appropriate “waiting period,” a self-dealing
Congress could create offices (or increase their pay) with the
understanding that those offices would be distributed to its
members—precisely the sort of behavior against which the
209
Emoluments Clause is meant to guard—but only if Congress admits
of resignations. Of course, in a situation in which Congress is acting in
such a self-dealing manner, it may well be inclined to allow

203. Id.
204. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4.
205. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 192, at 610 n.1.
206. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
207. This concern is responsible for the Emoluments Clause: “No Senator or Representative
shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall
have been encreased during such time . . . .” Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
208. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 192, at 394.
209. U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 2.
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resignations, but the import of Mason’s words is that this is a choice
to be made by the house—in other situations it may choose not to
admit of resignations. No member of the Convention challenged this
assumption, expressed by Madison, Morris, and Mason, that, absent a
clear statement to the contrary, resignation was up to the house, not
the member. Moreover, despite the unanimous assent to Madison’s
210
“absolutely necessary” (in Morris’s words) proposal to insert a
provision allowing senators to resign, no such provision was even
proposed for representatives.
As scant as the materials from the Philadelphia Convention are
regarding resignation from the House of Representatives, the postConvention materials are even less helpful. The issue does not appear
211
to have come up at all in the state ratifying conventions or in the
212
debates in the press. Moreover, the canonical early treatises on the
Constitution have little, if anything, to say about the House Vacancies
Clause and nothing to say about the permissibility of resignation. In
his famous Commentaries, Justice Story, after quoting the Vacancies
213
Clause, notes that “[t]he propriety of adopting this clause does not
seem to have furnished any matter of discussion, either in or out of
the convention,” approves of the mode of filling vacancies, and moves
214
215
on. The Clause received even less attention from Justice Wilson,
216
217
218
St. George Tucker, Thomas Cooley, and Chancellor Kent. Even
210. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 192, at 232.
211. See THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (5 vols.).
212. See THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (7 vols.); THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (2 vols.); THE FEDERALIST.
213. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
684, at 495 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, 5th ed. 1891).
214. Id. § 685.
215. See JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, Part Two: Of the Constitutions of the United
States and of Pennsylvania—Of the Legislative Department, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
399 passim (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (discussing the structure of Congress without
mentioning the provisions for filling vacancies).
216. See 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 177 n.59 (Philadelphia, Birch &
Small 1803) (noting only that state executives issue writs of election to fill House vacancies).
217. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 47 (Boston, Little, Brown 1880) (noting only that House
vacancies “are filled as may be provided by state laws”).
218. See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 207–27 (New York, Halsted
1826) (discussing the structure of Congress without mentioning the House Vacancies Clause at
all).
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Thomas Jefferson, the great parliamentarian of the early Republic,
220
had nothing to say about resignations.

219

B. House versus Senate
Does it make any sense to think that the Constitution would
employ different standards for resignation from the House and the
Senate? Professor Currie dismisses such a possibility in less than a
sentence tucked away in a footnote: “there appears to be no plausible
reason for treating the two chambers differently in this regard, and
thus every reason to conclude that the difference in phrasing was
221
222
accidental.” As we have seen, however, Convention delegates
made a deliberate decision—spearheaded by luminaries James
Madison and Gouverneur Morris—to add a mention of resignation to
the Senate Vacancies Clause. It would be a curious accident, indeed,
for it never to have occurred to a single delegate that the same issue
might arise with respect to the House Vacancies Clause. And yet, as
we have seen, not a single Convention delegate did raise this issue,
despite the unanimous assent to Madison’s insertion of resignation
into the Senate Vacancies Clause. Moreover, contra Currie, there are
at least three reasons why constitutional drafters and ratifiers might
have wanted to treat the two chambers differently in this regard:
length of term, method of election, and perceived function.
The first, and most straightforward, reason for distinguishing
between the House and Senate on the question of resignation is the
simple fact that Senate terms are three times as long as House
223
terms. A six-year Senate term without a right to resign may have
posed recruitment problems—after all, the new federal government
was an experiment. Perhaps the new government would turn out to
be a disaster, or perhaps service in the new Congress would turn out
to be as unpleasant as service in the old (Continental) Congress had

219. See Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why
Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly
Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1268–69 (2005) (describing Jefferson’s prowess as a
parliamentarian).
220. See Jefferson, supra note 8.
221. CURRIE, supra note 7, at 135 n.41.
222. See supra text accompanying note 199.
223. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing for a six-year Senate term); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1
(providing for a two-year House term).
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224

been. Indeed, during the ratification debates, even a federalist
pamphleteer described congressional service as a burden: members of
Congress “are taken from their professions and obliged to attend
Congress, some of them at the distance of at least seven hundred
225
miles.” Requiring potential senators to sign up for six-year terms—
226
longer than the terms of any state legislature’s upper house —
without a right to leave if things turned bad could have prevented
many of the nation’s brightest lights from taking a Senate seat.
Moreover, whether or not it affected recruiting, it may simply have
been thought inequitable to trap senators in a job they did not want
for six years. Such concerns would have been substantially less with
regards to a two-year House term.
Second, and relatedly, it was more plausible that someone would
be unwillingly elected to the Senate than to the House. Recall that,
227
until the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913,
228
senators were elected by state legislatures. To get the number of
popular votes necessary for election to the House, candidates would
almost certainly have to campaign or have their friends campaign on
their behalf. At the very least, knowledge that a candidate did not
want to serve would surely prevent the candidate’s election to the
House. But a cabal in the state legislature determined to remove
someone—say, the leader of the opposition party—from the state for
six years could simply appoint that person to the Senate. This is not
merely idle speculation—as we have seen, Gouverneur Morris was
concerned precisely with a situation in which a state legislature
229
appoints someone to a six-year Senate term without his consent.

224. See supra text accompanying notes 177–78 (discussing the unpleasantness of service in
the Continental Congress).
225. Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution,
by a Citizen of America, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at
129, 143.
226. See AMAR, supra note 182, at 75 (noting that no state upper house had a term of more
than five years).
227. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for the direct election of senators). But cf.
Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1354–55 (1996) (noting that, beginning in the
1890s, states had developed mechanisms to limit state legislatures’ discretion in choosing
senators); William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452,
463–67 (1955) (discussing the mechanisms used for expressing popular preferences for senators
before the Seventeenth Amendment).
228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
229. See supra text accompanying note 199.
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Moreover, at the Founding, members of the House of
Representatives were the only federal officeholders directly elected
by the people. As a federalist pamphleteer put it, the new
Constitution “is more a government of the people, than the present
[Continental] Congress ever was, because, the members of Congress
have been hitherto chosen by the legislatures of the several states.
230
The proposed representatives are to be chosen ‘BY THE PEOPLE.’”
Or, as Madison put it,
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the
rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant;
not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble
sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the
231
great body of the people of the United States.

With such exalted bosses, turning away from the job may have
been perceived as especially unseemly. Or, to put it differently,
republican obligation may be thought to bind more strongly when
service is a direct, unmediated command of the sovereign.
Finally, the House and Senate may be thought to have different
functions, which justify different treatment of resignations. Although
it is certainly the case that the Senate, unlike the Continental
232
Congress, is a true legislative body, it is equally the case that its
primary role in the Constitution’s bicameral scheme was the
representation of the states’ interests. Both the equality of
233
representation, without regard to population, and the mode of
234
appointment of senators served to ensure that the Senate was, in
235
Madison’s words, “a representation . . . of the States.” Hamilton

230. Plain Truth, Rebuttal to “An Officer of the Late Continental Army,” reprinted in 1 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 105, 105.
231. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 351 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
232. See AMAR, supra note 182, at 58 (comparing the Continental Congress—“a classic
assemblage of ambassadors”—to the new Congress under the Constitution—“a genuine
legislature”—and concluding that “the old Congress consisted of states’ men; the new Congress
would consist of statesmen”).
233. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each state . . . .”).
234. See id. (providing that Senators were to be chosen by state legislatures).
235. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison), supra note 231, at 357; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 231, at 244 (“The Senate . . . will derive its
powers from the States as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the
principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing [Continental] Congress.”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 231, at 377 (noting that the appointment
of senators by state legislatures “is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select
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concurred, referring to the Senate as “a direct representation” of the
236
states. Senators, as officeholders appointed by other officeholders
for the purpose of representing the interests of a political entity, may
237
have looked just enough like ambassadors to warrant treating them
like ambassadors for the purposes of resignation. In contrast, a House
of directly elected representatives, apportioned by population, was
fully and unmistakably a legislative body.
This interpretation of the differing roles of the House and Senate
is further bolstered by the practice of instruction in the early
Republic. As Professor Riker puts it, “[e]lection by state legislatures
238
implied accountability to them,” and the legislatures demanded this
accountability via instructions on how to vote, a practice carried over
239
from the Continental Congress. When a legislature had strong
opinions about an issue pending before Congress, it would pass a
resolution of the following form: “Be it resolved that our Senators in
Congress are hereby instructed, and our Representatives are
240
requested, to vote for . . . .” The difference in wording is a clear
consequence of the differences in institutional design between the
two houses of Congress. The House, like the state legislature, is
elected directly by the people and ultimately answerable only to
241
them. The Senate, on the other hand, was elected by the state
legislature and was therefore understood to be, in a sense, the agent
of the state legislature. Instructing one’s agent is perfectly
appropriate.
The problem, of course, was what to do if the senators disobeyed.
242
Without the recall provision of the Articles of Confederation, the

appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the
federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link
between the two systems”); id. at 378 (“No law or resolution can now be passed without the
concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States.”).
236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 231, at 76.
237. In this regard, it is also worth noting senators’ unique role in formulating foreign policy.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring the Senate’s “advice and consent” for making
treaties).
238. Riker, supra note 227, at 455.
239. Id. at 456 (“The doctrine of instructions followed naturally from political institutions
prior to the Constitution.”).
240. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
241. Indeed, the Constitution requires that the electorate for seats in the House be perfectly
coextensive with the electorate for seats in the lower house of the state legislature. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
242. See supra text accompanying note 175.
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only formal sanction the legislature had was a threat not to
243
reelect —but because senators’ terms were much longer than those
of state representatives, this was an uncertain threat: the legislative
majority that the senators disobeyed might no longer be in power
when the senators were up for reelection. Remarkably, however,
244
senators’ sense of honor
seems to have served to enforce
instructions in the early Republic. Beginning with John Quincy
245
Adams in 1808, senators who were unwilling to follow instructions
from their state legislatures were expected to resign. Although the
practice was not universally followed, Professor Riker counts fifteen
such “forced resignations” (and another six “almost forced”
246
resignations) between 1808 and 1854.
Instruction and forced resignation declined thereafter, as the
states increasingly used mechanisms, both formal and informal, to
gage popular sentiment in the choice of senators, thus decreasing
247
senators’ sense of accountability to state legislatures. The practice
of instruction ended entirely with the adoption of the Seventeenth
248
Amendment. The use of instructions thus highlights the quasiambassadorial role of senators in the early Republic, and the forcing
of resignations when senators were unwilling to obey those
instructions suggests another reason for treating the Senate
differently from the House in the matter of resignations.
Of course, none of these factors is conclusive, but collectively
they serve to undercut Professor Currie’s suggestion that there is “no
249
plausible reason” for treating the houses differently. Likewise,
although the scant evidence from the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution is not conclusive, it does support the thesis that members
of the House of Representatives were not meant to have the right to
resign. But the background norms from the British Parliament,
243. See Riker, supra note 227, at 457 (noting the North Carolina legislature’s refusal to
reelect Senator Samuel Johnston to the Second Congress because of his refusal to obey
instructions).
244. See generally JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC (2001) (discussing the role of honor in politics in the early Republic).
245. See Riker, supra note 227, at 458 (explaining how the Massachusetts state legislature
pressured Adams to resign after he voted for the Embargo Act).
246. Id. at 459 n.18.
247. See id. at 461–67 (tracing the decline of forced resignations and the reasons for that
decline).
248. See id. at 456 (“State legislatures did indeed continue until 1913 to instruct their
senators . . . .”).
249. CURRIE, supra note 7, at 135 n.41.
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carried through the colonial and state legislatures and the Continental
Congress, are clear that members have no right to resign, and nothing
in the Founding-era history evinces a desire to do away with those
norms. Indeed, insofar as the founding debates address the issue at
all, they lend support to that idea.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE
Thus far, we have seen that no right of legislators to resign has
ever existed at English law. We have seen that the English practice
formed a sufficiently powerful background legal norm that the only
American jurisdiction to reject it—Maryland, in its 1776
Constitution—did so explicitly. We have seen that the drafters of the
Constitution operated with the assumption that, unless they made
explicit provision for it, legislators would not have the right to resign.
We have seen that they did make explicit provision for the
resignation of senators; moreover, they had Randolph’s draft before
them, which would have explicitly provided for the resignation of
representatives, but they chose not to use that wording. All of this
combines to suggest that members of the House of Representatives
have no constitutional right to resign. As a constitutional matter,
members may request the House’s permission to surrender their
seats, but the House is not bound to give that permission.
Curiously, however, the House itself has seen the matter
differently almost from the beginning.
A. Early Congressional Practice
1. William Pinkney and John Francis Mercer. In 1790, William
250
Pinkney
was elected to the House of Representatives from
Maryland. However, he never took his seat, and, in September 1791,
he sent a letter to the governor and council of Maryland seeking to
251
resign his seat for what his nephew and biographer called “reasons
252
of a prudential and private nature.” The governor then issued a writ
250. Pinkney would go on to become “widely acknowledged to be the foremost lawyer of his
day.” Robert M. Ireland, William Pinkney: A Revision and Re-emphasis, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
235, 236 (1970). Pinkney represented the Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Ireland, supra, at 241–45 (discussing Pinkney’s role in the case).
251. See H.R. JOUR., 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 461 (Nov. 23, 1791) (reprinting the report of the
Committee of Elections that laid out the facts).
252. WILLIAM PINKNEY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PINKNEY 21 (New York, D. Appleton &
Co. 1853). Pinkney himself gave more details in a letter:
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for a new election, which was won by John Francis Mercer. When
Mercer sought to take his seat, the Committee of Elections was called
upon to determine who, if anyone, was entitled to the Maryland
254
seat.
255
The committee recommended seating Mercer, but substantial
debate ensued on the House floor. There were, essentially, three
positions represented. One was that, in the words of William
Loughton Smith of South Carolina, “the vacancy which had occurred
on this occasion could not properly be called a resignation. Mr.
256
PINKNEY had never taken his seat, nor the requisite oath.” It is not
altogether surprising that Smith should be a champion of this
257
258
position—as we have seen, the South Carolinian colonial and state
259
legislatures, like the British House of Commons, allowed for the
filling of a vacancy created by refusal to take the oath of office,
although none of them allowed for resignation. At least one
260
commentator saw this position as dispositive.
A second position held by some members was that, in the words
of Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, “the Constitution
I have not been elected by the third district, whose representative it was intended
I should be—I resided in a part of the state, whose interests, in some respects, are
supposed to be at variance with theirs.—The legality of my election has been
questioned.—I have not had time or opportunity to prepare my mind for the expected
business in the continental legislature—and I have not health adequate to that degree
of exertion which my situation would of necessity require.—On such terms I cannot
serve.
Dependent altogether on my profession, my time is of the last importance to
myself and family—nor will the loss of it, as I am circumstanced, be easily repaired. I
am too young at the bar to intermit my professional duties for months together. In a
word—it would be ruinous to me . . . .
Letter from William Pinkney (Sept. 28, 1791), as reprinted in Extract of a Letter from One of the
Representatives of This State in Congress, to His Friend in This Town, Dated Hartford County,
Sept. 28, 1791, N.Y. J. & PATRIOTIC REG., Oct. 12, 1791, at 323 [hereinafter Extract of a Letter].
253. H.R. JOUR., 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 461 (Nov. 23, 1791).
254. Id. at 451 (Nov. 9, 1791) (referring the matter to the committee).
255. Id. at 461 (Nov. 23, 1791).
256. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 206 (1791); see also id. at 206–07 (statement of Rep. Murray)
(stating “several particulars to show that Mr. PINKNEY was not a member of the House
agreeably to the Constitution”); id. at 207 (summarizing the statements of Elbridge Gerry, who
expressed a similar sentiment).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 119–22.
258. See supra text accompanying note 158.
259. See supra text accompanying note 47.
260. See James Mercer Garnett, John Francis Mercer, Governor of Maryland, 1801 to 1803, 2
MD. HIST. MAG. 191, 207 (1907) (“[I]t took [the House] three days to decide how [Mercer]
should take his seat, all due to the fact that William Pinkney had never taken his seat, nor the
oath of office.”).
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261

contemplates that a member may resign.” Joshua Seney, a fellow
Marylander, rather ahistorically pronounced it a “new and very
262
strange declaration to say that a member had not a right to resign.”
He also suggested that refusing to allow the resignation would cause
263
an unacceptable “inconvenience . . . to the State of Maryland” and
that it could potentially affect “the privilege of every free citizen”
264
who might find himself elected against his will and forced to serve.
Finally, he argued that “no difference did really exist” between the
265
House and the Senate on the matter of resignation, although he
made no attempt to explain the different wording of the Vacancies
Clauses.
Finally, there were members who thought that there was no right
of resignation. William Branch Giles of Virginia made two arguments
in this vein. First, he suggested that allowing for this sort of
resignation would give state governors an improper level of control
over the composition of the House:
The constitution says, that when vacancies happen, the Executive
may issue writs to fill up those vacancies; but it does not say that
resignation causes a vacancy; and if the Executive in the present
instance judges of the circumstances that cause a vacancy, he may do
it in every instance; in which case, the members of the House may be
266
reduced to hold their seats on a very precarious tenure indeed.

That is, if state executives, rather than the House itself, had the
power to accept resignations, then a governor could create a vacancy
at any point simply by declaring that the person holding the seat had
resigned. That begins to look uncomfortably like the power of recall
267
in the Articles of Confederation. On this point, Giles was explicitly
268
seconded by Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, and Theodore Sedgwick

261. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 207 (1791) (statement of Rep. Williamson).
262. M. ST. CLAIR CLARKE & DAVID A. HALL, CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN
CONGRESS, FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE 46 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 207 (1791) (statement of Rep. Seney).
266. CLARKE & HALL, supra note 262, at 45.
267. See supra text accompanying note 175 (noting the states’ power to recall congressional
delegates under the Articles).
268. CLARKE & HALL, supra note 262, at 45.
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of Massachusetts made a similar point.
republican and historical one:

269
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Giles’ second point was a

From recurring to the Constitution, he was of opinion that a
resignation did not constitute a vacancy. The Constitution speaks
only of vacancies in general, and does not contemplate one as
resulting from a resignation. Adverting to the British House of
Commons, he observed that in that body there could be no
resignation. This is an established principle. The people having once
chosen their representatives, their power ceases, and consequently
the body to which the resignation ought to be made no longer exists.
From the experience of the British Government in this respect, he
270
argued against a deviation from this rule.

That is, the American representative, like the British, answers
only to the people. A resignation made to the governor violates this
principle. Fisher Ames of Massachusetts suggested that allowing
resignations without the House’s consent would deprive the House of
one of its traditional privileges: “the House, he observed, has a
control over absent members; but if a member may resign when he
pleases, he may do it out of the House, and withdraw himself from
271
the power of the House whenever he thinks proper.”
Ultimately, the House agreed to the resolution offered by the
Committee of Elections that “John Francis Mercer is entitled to take
a seat in this House as one of the Representatives for the State of
272
Maryland, in the stead of William Pinkney.” Mercer was seated on
273
February 6, 1792. What remains unclear is to what extent this
decision should be read as recognizing a broad right of members to
resign from the House and to what extent it should be read as limited
to the case of a member-elect who had not yet taken the oath of
office. Recall that, even in the British House of Commons, one in
Pinkney’s position could have triggered a vacancy by refusing to take
274
the oaths. Moreover, at least some of the members in the debate
seemed to consider it quite important that Pinkney had not yet taken
275
the oath. It was thus still an open question whether the House

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

3 ANNALS OF CONG. 207 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
Id. at 205–06 (statement of Rep. Giles).
CLARKE & HALL, supra note 262, at 46.
H.R. JOUR., 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 461 (Nov. 23, 1791).
Id. at 502 (Feb. 6, 1792).
See supra text accompanying note 47.
See supra text accompanying notes 256–60.
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would allow a member who had already begun to serve to resign as a
matter of right.
2. Joshua Seney and William Hindman. On December 6, 1792,
the Speaker “laid before the House a letter from Joshua Seney, one
of the Members for the State of Maryland, stating his acceptance of
an appointment in the Judiciary Department of the said State, which
276
disqualifies him from a seat in this House.” This was not the sort of
277
appointment that triggered the Incompatibility Clause, which meant
that Seney would actually have to resign from the House.
Unfortunately, the Annals of Congress offer only a tantalizing hint of
the debate. On December 7,
[t]he Letter from Mr. SENEY, containing his resignation was again
read, and a motion made to refer the same to a committee; some
debate ensued on this motion, in which the question was started how
far it was in the power of a member of the House to vacate his seat;
the solution of this, it was said, would involve a lengthy discussion of
some constitutional questions; if it was the opinion of the House that
the present case naturally included this discussion, the reference
ought to be to a Committee of the Whole. Some gentlemen thought
that the most simple process was to accept the resignation, and make
entry accordingly in the Journal; a notification to be sent to the
Executive of the State of Maryland. The motion for commitment of
the Letter was negatived; a motion was then made that the SPEAKER
of the House notify the Executive of the State of Maryland of a
[vacancy in the] representation of that State, by the resignation of
Mr. SENEY. This motion was negatived and the Letter laid on the
278
table.
279

From this truncated account, it appears that the House debated
where and how to debate the constitutional issues surrounding
Seney’s resignation, and, finding themselves unable to agree, simply
did nothing. The Journal of the House of Representatives from
December 7 confirms that no notification was sent to the Maryland
280
governor. The governor, however, seems to have taken matters into

276. H.R. JOUR., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 635 (Dec. 6, 1792).
277. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (providing that members of Congress cannot
simultaneously hold “any Office under the United States” (emphasis added)).
278. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 739–40 (1792).
279. This passage in the Annals is the only account of this debate that I have been able to
find.
280. H.R. JOUR., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 635 (Dec. 7, 1792).
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his own hands: on January 23, 1793, the Speaker laid before the
House a letter from the Maryland governor announcing that William
Hindman had been elected to replace Seney; this letter, too, was
281
ordered to lie on the table. One week later, Hindman “appeared,
produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House, the oath to
support the Constitution of the United States being first administered
282
to him by Mr. Speaker, according to law.” There is no other
283
recorded debate on the matter.
3. John Francis Mercer and Gabriel Duvall. The debate over the
first resignation from the Third Congress appears to have been even
briefer. On May 31, 1794, the Speaker laid before the House a letter
from the governor of Maryland announcing that John Francis
Mercer—the same Mercer who had replaced William Pinkney after
his resignation—had resigned and that Gabriel Duvall had been
284
elected to replace him. The matter was referred to the Committee
285
of Elections, which determined that Duvall should be seated. The
286
House voted to do so. Again, the Annals provide a noticeably
truncated account, including the tantalizing note that “[s]ome
remarks fell from Mr. LEE respecting precedent. Mr. MERCER had
formerly taken a seat in much the same way, in the room of Mr.
287
PINKNEY.” It is also worth noting that, although some members
wanted to seat Duvall without voting on the Committee of Elections’
288
report, James Madison insisted that the report be voted on. This
may indicate that Madison continued to believe that a resignation was
not effective until the House voted to accept it.
4. Uriah Forrest and Benjamin Edwards. After the Mercer
resignation, the issue of resigning does not seem to have occasioned
any floor debate at all. On January 1, 1795, the Speaker laid before
the House a letter from Uriah Forrest, a representative from

281. Id. at 677 (Jan. 23, 1793).
282. Id. at 686 (Jan. 30, 1793).
283. After the truncated debate of December 7, the Annals also notes the letter from the
Maryland governor, 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 835 (1793), and the seating of Hindman, id. at 853.
One searches the intervening pages in vain, however, for any additional discussion.
284. H.R. JOUR., 3d Cong., 1st Sess. 192–93 (May 31, 1794).
285. H.R. JOUR., 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (Nov. 11, 1794).
286. Id. at 226.
287. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 874 (1794).
288. Id. (statement of Rep. Madison).
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Maryland, stating that he had tendered his resignation to the
governor and that Benjamin Edwards had been elected to replace
him. This was accompanied by a letter from the clerk of the Maryland
council, confirming both that Forrest had resigned and that Edwards
289
had been elected in his stead. The letters were committed to the
290
Committee of Elections. The next day, two more letters arrived—
one from the governor, confirming that Edwards had been elected to
replace Forrest, and the other a copy of Forrest’s letter of resignation
291
292
to the governor. These, too, were referred to the committee. That
same day, January 2, the committee reported a resolution to seat
293
Edwards. The preamble to the resolution certified that Forrest had
indeed resigned and that Edwards had indeed been elected to replace
294
him; nowhere did it suggest any doubt as to the propriety of
295
resignation. The resolution was accepted by the House without any
296
297
recorded debate, and Edwards was immediately sworn in.
*

*

*

Why did the practice of the early House diverge so sharply from
the practice and understanding up to that point? Although the
available sources do not allow us to pin down a reason with precision,
it should not pass without comment that the first four members to
298
resign from the House were all Marylanders. As we have seen, the
Maryland Constitution was the only state constitution to provide for
legislative resignation. The Maryland political class may simply have
had a different conception of the role of the legislator than did the
politicians from other states—a less republican role that allowed for
299
resignation whenever convenient. This would help to explain why,
289. H.R. JOUR., 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 279 (Jan. 1, 1795).
290. Id.
291. Id. (Jan. 2, 1795).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 280.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1041 (1795).
297. H.R. JOUR., 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (Jan. 2, 1795).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 168–69.
299. Compare Extract of a Letter, supra note 252 (“I enclose my resignation, which you will
be please [sic] to forward to the executive” (quoting William Pinkney)), with Mr. Gore’s
Resignation, HERALD OF FREEDOM & FED. ADVERTISER, Feb. 2, 1790, at 144 (describing
Christopher Gore’s “ask[ing] leave of the Hon. House” to give up his seat in the Massachusetts
state legislature).
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by the Third Congress, four Maryland representatives had resigned
when not a single representative from any other state had, and the
idea may have subsequently spread from those Maryland
300
representatives to their colleagues.
B. Contemporary Congressional Practice
1. The Resignation of Benjamin Whittemore. Thereafter, the
matter seems to have been settled. Members were understood to have
the right to resign at will, and throughout the nineteenth century, they
301
did so. Thus, in 1870, while facing an expulsion resolution for
allegedly selling appointments to the Military and Naval Academies,

300. A series of letters between De Witt Clinton, writing on behalf of his uncle George
Clinton, the governor of New York, and the New York congressional delegation illustrates the
spreading of this norm. Silas Talbot, a member of the House of Representatives from New
York, sought to resign his seat by letter to the governor. Clinton wrote, in a letter addressed to
the entire New York delegation, that
an important question results for consideration, which is, the constitutional tribunal
to decide whether a vacancy happens or not, the executive authority of the state or
the house of representatives.
The governor is inclined to believe from the right of the house to judge of its own
members and from inherent power in every legislative assembly to preserve and
perpetuate its own existence, that the proper tribunal is the house of
representatives . . . .
Letter from De Witt Clinton to New York Congressional Delegation (Dec. 19, 1794), in AM.
MINERVA, Mar. 14, 1795, at 2. The delegation wrote back that, “whatever doubt might have
been entertained on this point at the commencement of the government, the question has been
since settled in practice . . . . [W]e beg leave to refer your Excellency to the printed Journals of
the house of Representatives . . . .” Letter II (Jan. 1795), in AM. MINERVA, Mar. 14, 1795, at 2.
Clinton shot back, “That precedents as to this point have existed prior to the case of Mr. Talbot
is not believed and if they have occurred, they have escaped the Governor’s notice, who is too
much engaged in the important duties of his office to study attentively the journals of
Congress . . . .” Letter III (Jan. 31, 1795), in AM. MINERVA, Mar. 14, 1795, at 2. Talbot served
out the rest of his term (which, after all, ended on March 3, 1795).
Of course, the precedents to which the New York members were referring were the
Maryland members’ resignations. We thus see an aberrational practice of a single state being
introduced by that state’s representatives into Congress, leading representatives of other states
quickly to assume that it was the norm—an assumption that surprised those familiar with
legislative procedure in their home states.
301. As an example of how routinized resignation quickly became, Representative Thomas
Oakley of New York submitted a letter of resignation on May 9, 1828. H.R. JOUR., 20th Cong.,
1st Sess. 719 (May 9, 1828). The next day, he was replaced on a committee. Id. at 720 (May 10,
1828). On December 1, 1828, Thomas Taber, II, was seated as his replacement. H.R. JOUR., 20th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (Dec. 1, 1828). There was no debate or vote on the matter whatsoever. See 4
REG. DEB. 2640 (May 9, 1828) (accepting Oakley’s resignation without debate); 5 id. at 95 (Dec.
1, 1828) (beginning the new session without even noting the seating of Taber).
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Benjamin Whittemore of South Carolina tendered his resignation.
Several members thought it was inappropriate to allow Whittemore
to resign in order to escape the shame of expulsion, and two of them
questioned the permissibility of resignation generally. Nathaniel
Banks of Massachusetts, a former Speaker of the House, thought that
the House will be led into great difficulty if it accepts the doctrine
that a member can resign his seat without the consent of the House.
No principle of parliamentary law is better established, either in
England or in this country, than that a member of a parliamentary
body cannot resign without the consent of that body, either
303
expressed or implied.

The current Speaker, James Blaine, replied that “there never has
been, as I am fortified by the opinion of the Journal clerk—there
never has been a record of the acceptance of a resignation since the
304
House was organized,”
the implication being that no such
acceptance was necessary. The Speaker continued, “The uniform
practice of the House of Representatives from the foundation of the
Government has been that when the resignation of a member has
been handed in at the Clerk’s desk, the Chair must then cease to
305
recognize him as a member.” However, “[i]f the House wishes to
override that decision of the Chair, such positive action must emanate
306
from the floor of the House.” That is, the House is not bound to
accept a resignation, but a tendered resignation is automatically in
effect until overtly overridden by the House.
Henry Dawes of Massachusetts thought that the Speaker had it
backward: when the Speaker accepts a resignation as a matter of
course, that should be understood as acceptance by unanimous
307
consent. When an objection is raised, however, the issue should
presumably be put to a vote, like any other. Dawes listed what he saw
as the baleful implications of allowing “that a member can resign
308
whether the House will or not” :

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

H.R. JOUR., 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 372–73 (Feb. 24, 1870).
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1545–46 (1870) (statement of Rep. Banks).
Id. at 1546 (statement of Rep. Blaine).
Id.
Id.
Id. (statement of Rep. Dawes).
Id.
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If a member, when the Constitution clothes us with the power to
punish a member for any offense here, can prevent us from
discharging that duty by resigning, whether we will or not, the power
of the House to control its own constitution is at an end. If a
member can resign, whether the House will or not, we can be left at
any moment without a quorum by a certain number of members
309
sending papers of resignation to the desk.

John Bingham then raised a point of order, insisting that “the
capacity of a member to resign has been disposed of,” and the chair
310
ruled Dawes’s remarks out of order, putting an end to the debate
over resignation.
2. The Statute of 1872. Today, it seems unlikely that even two
members could be found to join Banks and Dawes in their stance
against a right to resign. Federal law in effect since 1872 allows states
to set the time for filling House vacancies, “whether such vacancy is
caused by a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law, or by the
311
death, resignation, or incapacity of a person elected.” This explicit
recognition of the possibility of resignation is accompanied by a
House practice that “[a] Member properly submits his resignation to
an official designated by State law and simply informs the House of
his doing so, the latter communication being satisfactory evidence of
312
the resignation.” In short, the House has essentially concluded that
resignation is a matter of individual right—that is, a matter for the
313
member alone to decide.
V. HOW SHOULD THE HOUSE TREAT RESIGNATIONS TODAY?
What relevance does this history have for contemporary
congressional procedure? Could House practice be changed to make
resignation no longer a matter of right? If so, how—and, perhaps
more importantly, why? Alternatively, if it could not or should not be
changed, does the understanding that it was not originally meant to
be a constitutional right hold any valuable lessons for us today?

309. Id.
310. Id. (statements of Reps. Bingham and Blaine).
311. 2 U.S.C. § 8 (2006) (originally passed as part of the Apportionment Act of 1872, ch. 11,
§ 4, 17 Stat. 28, 29 (1872)).
312. BROWN & JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 484.
313. Today, House resignations are commonplace. See supra note 1 (listing some recent
resignations). These resignations draw no debate whatsoever in the House.
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My contention in this Part is that there are good reasons for
ceasing to treat resignation as a matter of right. That is to say, there
are good reasons, sounding in republican political theory, for
requiring members to obtain the consent of the House before quitting
their seats. Before going into these reasons, however, it will be helpful
to state a few preliminaries.
314
First, it should be noted that the 1872 statute poses no bar to a
decision by the House that resignation is not a matter of right. The
Rules of Proceedings Clause leaves the determination of each
315
chamber’s procedural rules up to that chamber. Any attempt to
create House rules by legislation eliminates cameral autonomy by
introducing bicameralism and presentment into the mix and therefore
316
cannot bind the House. Thus, although there is no constitutional
317
problem with the House’s following the 1872 statute, it could also
alter the statutory scheme by a simple resolution.
It should also be noted, however, that the reasons for treating the
House and Senate differently with regard to resignations have
become less salient over time, especially with the passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment. As we have seen, there were at least three
reasons at the Founding for distinguishing between the chambers in
318
this regard. First, Senate terms are significantly longer than House
terms. The strength of this reason remains undiminished. The second
reason, however, was the possibility that someone would be elected to
the Senate against his will by an unfriendly state legislature. The
319
Seventeenth Amendment’s move to popular elections for senators
has made this at least as unlikely for the Senate as it is for the House.
And third, the two chambers were understood at the Founding to
have somewhat different functions, with the Senate looking more like
a collection of ambassadors and the House a more popular

314. 2 U.S.C. § 8; see also supra note 311 and accompanying text.
315. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . .”).
316. For more detailed elaborations of this principle, see CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 57–59;
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process Is Broken, Can a Statute Fix It?,
85 NEB. L. REV. 960, 1007–10 (2007); Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act
Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1779–87 (2002).
317. Indeed, because the 1872 statute was passed by the House, its scheme remains in effect
until the House overrides it.
318. See supra Part III.B.
319. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years . . . .”).
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representative body. The move to popular election of senators has
dimmed this distinction, but it has not eliminated it. For one thing,
320
the states’ equality of representation in the Senate means that the
Senate’s constituencies remain the states, rather than the American
people as a whole. In contrast, representation in the House must be
321
generally proportional, which makes the individual citizen the
fundamental unit of representation for the House. For another,
representatives remain significantly more numerous than senators,
making them, in some sense, more popular representatives.
It should also be made explicit what it would mean if the House
were to stop allowing resignations as a matter of right. It would mean
simply that, for a resignation to become effective, the House would
have to vote to accept it. In many cases—for instance, when a
member seeks to resign because of health issues—the resignation
would most likely be accepted as a matter of course.
But there are also countervailing considerations. Refusing to
allow resignations might punish constituents by forcing on them an
unwilling representative. It might also be seen as unfair to the
representatives themselves. And it should certainly give us pause that
it would fly in the face of over two centuries of American practice.
With these background issues in mind, it is worth considering
what reasons we might have today for wanting to restrict resignation
from the House. Below, I present two paradigm cases that, I submit,
demonstrate why such a restriction would be valuable. Although
there may be other reasons for restricting resignation (for example,
322
preventing representatives from gaming the seniority system or,
323
possibly, preventing them from manipulating quorum counts ), these

320. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing that each state shall have two senators); see also id. art. V
(providing that no constitutional amendment may deprive a state of its equal representation in
the Senate without that state’s consent).
321. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that the constitutional
requirement that representatives be chosen by the people “means that as nearly as is practicable
one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s”).
322. Members could time their resignations so that their successors could be elected both to
serve out the remainder of their term and for the next term. These successors would only get a
few days of legislative experience in the expiring term, but they would have seniority over all of
the other entering freshmen in the next Congress. Denying such late-in-the-game retirement
requests could prevent this outcome, as could dating members’ seniority from the beginning of
their first full term.
323. The Constitution states that “a Majority of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum to
do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to
compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties, as each
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two paradigm cases seem to present not only the most compelling
reasons for rethinking the House’s position on the resignation of
members but also the clearest view of the ways in which republican
values are best served by such a rethinking.
A. Punishing Members
The first paradigm case is that of the member who resigns to
escape some sort of punishment by the House. Expulsion from—and
perhaps even censure by—the House carries a stigma greater than
that of resignation, even resignation under fire. After all, the
324
tendency of members to resign when facing likely expulsion can

House may provide.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. The House currently interprets a quorum as
“a majority of those Members sworn and living, whose membership has not been terminated by
resignation or by House action.” BROWN & JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 733. Under this
interpretation, resignation lowers the numerator and the denominator and therefore has no
effect. But recent scholarship suggests that this interpretation may be wrong and that the proper
denominator for quorum purposes is the number of seats. See Williams, supra note 153, at 1051–
64 (discussing the evolution of House quorum rules).
If this latter interpretation is correct, then a mass resignation could deprive the House of
a quorum. Consider the following scenario: It is November 3, 2010. The Democrats hold a twovote majority in the House, but there are three vacancies, so the Democrats alone are
insufficient for a quorum. Democrats also control the Senate and the presidency. As a result of
the previous day’s elections, however, the Republicans will assume control of the House on
January 3, 2011. The House Democratic leadership has resolved to use its few remaining days in
power to pass a number of controversial bills. However, in a striking display of party discipline,
every House Republican resigns on November 4, thus preventing the assembly of a quorum
before the beginning of the next Congress in January. This may seem farfetched, but we have
seen that it was a worry for Representative Dawes in 1870, see supra text accompanying note
309, and mass flight—although not mass resignation—was a worry for the Texas legislature in
2003, see Edward Walsh, Texas Legislature Adjourns a Special Session: Governor to Call
Members Back a 3rd Time to Force Vote on GOP Redistricting Plan, WASH. POST, Aug. 27,
2003, at A4 (describing how Texas senate Democrats blocked what they alleged was a
gerrymandering attempt by state Republicans by leaving the state and consequently depriving
the state senate of the required two thirds quorum).
Note that this worry is unique to the House for two reasons. Under the Seventeenth
Amendment, governors may, in accordance with state law, appoint replacements to fill Senate
vacancies until a new election can be held. Thus, a few governors could stymie any attempt to
deprive the Senate of a quorum by mass resignation. In the House, where vacancies can only be
filled by election, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4, it would take significantly longer to fill those
seats. Second, Senate terms are staggered. Although it might be plausible that House members
would resign en masse in the scenario sketched above—after all, they have all either just been
reelected, in which case they will get their seats back in two months, or they are only giving up
two months of time in Congress anyway—it is highly unlikely that senators, many of whom
would have two or four years remaining in their terms, would be willing to go along.
324. Of the eight House resignations noted in the Introduction, see supra note 1, four of
them—Representatives Cunningham, DeLay, Foley, and Ney—resulted from behavior which

CHAFETZ.DOC

228

10/31/2008 1:22:57 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:177

only be explained by a sense that resignation is preferable to
expulsion. Indeed, this phenomenon is not limited to members of
Congress: “You can’t fire me; I quit!” has become a popular literary
325
trope.
Although resignation from the House does not prevent a
326
censure (and perhaps should not prevent imprisonment by the
327
House ), it clearly does prevent expulsion. Insofar as a member has
an interest in telling the House, “You can’t fire me; I quit!”, the
House may have an equally strong interest in replying, “You can’t
quit; we’ve just fired you!” Indeed, we saw exactly this debate play
328
out over the resignation of Benjamin Whittemore in 1870.
Whittemore sought to resign precisely to avoid being disciplined over
his ethical lapses, and Henry Dawes, arguing against the right of
resignation, told the House that “[i]f a member, when the
Constitution clothes us with the power to punish a member for any
offense here, can prevent us from discharging that duty by resigning,
whether we will or not, the power of the House to control its own
329
constitution is at an end.” We have seen a similar impulse in the
House of Commons, where the Chiltern Hundreds was denied in the
mid-nineteenth century to keep members from taking advantage of
330
“corrupt compromises.”
And at least one English-descended

allegedly breached ethical rules to an extent that expulsion would not have been at all
improbable. A fifth, Representative Janklow, resigned after being convicted of manslaughter.
325. See, e.g., Jan Battles, Bell X1 and Label ‘Agree to Part’, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb.
11, 2007, at 3 (“You can’t fire us—we quit. Bell X1, Ireland’s biggest band after U2, have left
their record company days after rumours that they were being dumped.”); Adam Bernstein,
Oscar Brown Jr. Dies; Songwriter, Performer Had Eclectic Career, WASH. POST, May 31, 2005,
at B7 (“‘We were really young zealots, and that went on till I got booted out of the Communist
party when I was 30 years old, about 1956. It was one of those situations where “you can’t fire
me, I quit!” We fell out on the race question. I was just too black to be red!’” (quoting the
deceased, Oscar Brown, Jr.)); Harvey Blume, Alan Dershowitz, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 2006,
at E3 (summarizing Professor Alan Dershowitz’s criticism of Lawrence Summers’s resignation
as president of Harvard as “You can’t fire me; I quit”).
326. See CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 93 (noting that the House’s power of punishing
members “extends to punishing former Members for disorderly acts done while Members”).
327. Each house of Congress has the power to punish contempts against it and breaches of
its privileges, whether those offenses are committed by Members or non-Members. Available
punishments against members include expulsion, imprisonment, fine, censure or reprimand, and
loss of seniority. See id. at 207–35; see also Josh Chafetz, Politician, Police Thyself, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2006, at A15 (arguing for an increased use of the congressional houses’ own disciplinary
powers against their members, including the power of arrest).
328. See supra Part IV.B.1.
329. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1546 (1870) (statement of Rep. Dawes).
330. See supra text accompanying notes 108–10.
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legislature refused a resignation in the twentieth century for the same
reason—in 1951, the lower house of the Indian parliament refused to
331
allow a resignation when it sought, instead, to expel a member.
In short, although the disciplinary power of the House would
continue to extend to actions taken by former members while in
office, there are more—and more serious—punishment options
available while the member remains in the House. Moreover, given
the large number of demands on the House’s time, it may be more
likely to take an “out of sight, out of mind” approach: why bother
disciplining a member who is already gone? But for many ethical
breaches, the expressive value of an explicit condemnation may be
great—that is, the claim that a member is resigning “to spend more
time with family” ought not to be allowed to pass without
institutional comment. If inaction was not an option—that is, if the
House had to vote on whether or not to accept the member’s
resignation—it might decide that it would be just as easy (and
considerably more cathartic) to vote instead to expel the member.
The expressive value of such expulsions might do a lot to increase the
332
public perception of congressional ethical standards. Moreover, the
fact that members of the House are closer to the people and elected
333
on terms of numerical equality by the people may make ethical
breaches by House members especially suitable for public expressions
of outrage, whereas ethical breaches by senators, who are more
removed from the people and whose unit of representation remains
the state, may be less so.
Note that this rationale for refusing to allow resignations as a
matter of right does not presuppose that members would actually be
kept in the House against their will. Rather, it changes the terms of
the bargaining over how they leave the House. Under existing rules,
individual members hold all of the power, as the decision is entirely
theirs. But the change proposed here would shift power to the

331. See Madhu Dandavate, The Future of Parliamentary Democracy, in FIFTY YEARS OF
INDIAN PARLIAMENT 366, 371 (G.C. Malhotra ed., 2002) (discussing the H.C. Mudgal expulsion
and noting that his attempt to resign was considered an “attempt to circumvent the effects of the
motion expelling him from the House . . . which constituted a contempt of the House and
aggravated his offence”); see also ARUN PROKAS CHATTERJEE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES
IN INDIA 59 (1971) (discussing the same case).
332. See Josh Chafetz, Comment, Cleaning House: Congressional Commissioners for
Standards, 117 YALE L.J. 165, 166–67 (2007) (arguing that the public perception of
congressional action against corruption is in the public interest).
333. See supra text accompanying note 321.
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House—it would allow the House as an institution to dictate the
terms on which members leave. More importantly, however, it would
constrain the House in dictating those terms: if members had to vote
either way in a floor vote, then they would have to explain why they
voted to let an obviously corrupt member walk away without any sort
of condemnation. In short, members under an ethical cloud who
wanted to leave the House would still leave the House—but their
colleagues would be forced to contemplate whether the voters
consider the ethical transgressions of that member sufficiently
egregious to demand institutional comment by the House. The
expressive costs of allowing a member to resign for spurious reasons
would thereby be internalized by the House rather than externalized
onto the polity.
B. Duty of Service
The second paradigm case is that of members who seek to resign
because they are simply sick of the job or wish to take jobs that are
more lucrative or personally convenient. The recent resignation of
334
former Speaker Dennis Hastert fits this bill—shortly before he
announced that he was stepping down, an anonymous Republican
aide told CNN that “I think he is just done with being a member of
335
Congress.” That is to say, the job ceased to interest him, so, rather
336
than serve out the remainder of his two year commitment, he quit.
Whether or not we allow our representatives to resign says
something about how we see our government and how our
representatives see their relationship with us. “The truth is,” Plato
argued, “that the city where those who rule are least eager to do so
337
will be the best governed and the least plagued by dissension.” The
ruling class must therefore be trained to approach ruling as “an

334. See Parsons & Pearson, supra note 1.
335. Congressional Sources: Hastert Won’t Serve Out His Term, CNN.COM, Oct. 18, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/18/hastert/index.html.
336. In the same vein, one could also consider Representative Albert Wynn of Maryland,
who, as the New York Times noted, “lost to a primary challenger in February and promptly
announced that he would retire in June—the sooner to become a high-paid partner in a
Washington lobbying powerhouse. Mr. Wynn leaves constituents the choice of having no
representation for six months or holding a costly special election.” Editorial, Trolling for the
Spoils of Office, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, § 4 (Week in Review), at 13.
337. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC ¶ 520d, at 214 (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans.,
1985).
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imposed necessity.” Although he had the convenient aid of a noble
lie to reinforce the expectation of public spiritedness in the ruling
339
340
class, Plato understood that education would do the heavy lifting.
The polis would be best governed when those governing it had
successfully been inculcated with certain norms of public service and
devotion to the commonweal.
This republican ethos can be traced from the ancient world to
Florentine political theory and from Florentine theory to Atlantic
341
practice. It is evident in the House of Commons’ insistence that Sir
Thomas Estcourt could not refuse his seat, because refusal “were to
prefer the will, or contentment, of a private man, before the desire
342
and satisfaction of the whole country.” It is apparent, too, in the
behavior of delegates to the Continental Congress, who endured
unpleasant service, far from home, in an ineffectual body out of a
343
sense of republican obligation. And we have seen it in Nathaniel
Banks’s and Henry Dawes’s insistence that Benjamin Whittemore
ought to be forced to stand before the House and be punished for
344
selling the public trust, rather than be allowed to resign.
Arrayed against that, we have seen a conception of legislative
service as private right. On this view, legislative service is a job like
any other, to be sought after when desired and put aside when
something more attractive comes along—that is, when one is “just
done with” it. This is a view that sees it as preposterous and unjust
that members who wish to resign may be kept in their seats against
their will. This is the view that has won the day in America, starting
with the Second Congress.
Under this latter view, members who were not allowed to leave
the House at the time of their choosing would be subject to something
like specific performance of an employment contract—which, as

338. Id. ¶ 520e, at 214.
339. See id. ¶¶ 414b-15c, at 112–13 (advocating a “noble lie” inculcating the message that
the ruling class was born to rule the polis, thereby reinforcing an ethic of service among the
members of that class).
340. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 376c-412b, at 72–110 (discussing the education of the guardians).
341. See POCOCK, supra note 11 passim (tracing this flow of ideas); see also MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 166
(1996) (“Jacksonians and Whigs retained the . . . assumption that the public good is more than
the sum of individual preferences or interests.”); supra text accompanying notes 9–13.
342. GLANVILLE, supra note 14, at 101. See generally supra text accompanying notes 14–20.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 183–85.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 302–10.
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every first-year contracts student knows, is widely frowned upon.
Under the republican view, however, legislative service is not
appropriately analogized to an employment contract. The republican
would, instead, note that those who voluntarily enlist in the military
347
can be forced to remain in the service against their will, and, indeed,
348
that they can have their tours of duty involuntarily extended. The
military enlistment contract specifically provides that military
349
enlistment “is more than an employment agreement.”
The
republican would suggest that legislative service is best thought of in
the same vein.
I submit that it is the republican view which better expresses our
sense of what the most representative branch of government ought to
350
be. House service is unlikely to be foisted on those who have not
sought it. Is it really so onerous to tell people who ran for House seats
that they must remain there for two years? Members are well
compensated, in both financial and psychic wages, and for that
345. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 987–99 (6th ed.
2003).
346. See, e.g., Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 317–18 (7th Cir. 1894); Lumley v. Wagner, (1852)
42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (Ch.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981);
Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 779, 783 (1983).
But see Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 1–3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114799
(arguing both that, rightly read, the Thirteenth Amendment does not enact a blanket
prohibition on specific performance of employment contracts and that, in many cases, specific
performance is preferable to damages as a remedy for breach of an employment contract).
347. See 10 U.S.C. § 886 (2006) (providing punishments for going absent without leave).
348. See id. § 506 (providing for involuntary extension of enlistments during wartime); id.
§ 12305 (“[T]he President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement,
or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces who the President determines is
essential to the national security of the United States.”); see also Doe v. Rumsfeld, 435 F.3d 980,
984–88 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding military “stop-loss” orders, issued pursuant to 10 U.S.C.
§ 12305, against constitutional and statutory challenges).
349. Armed Forces of the United States, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, DD Form
4/1, at 2 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/eforms/
dd0004.pdf.
350. See BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, in
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER WRITINGS 3, 112–13 (Kenneth Silverman ed., 1986) (taking as a
personal maxim, “I shall never ask, never refuse, nor ever resign an Office”); ANDREW SABL,
RULING PASSIONS: POLITICAL OFFICES AND DEMOCRATIC ETHICS 145 (2002) (arguing that the
unique virtue of the legislator is “love of fame”—that is, “the determination to engage in
‘extensive and arduous enterprises for the public good’”). Indeed, the House seems to recognize
a republican ethic of service insofar as it requires that the resignation of its own officers (for
example, its clerk, sergeant, etc.) is “subject to acceptance by the House.” CONSTITUTION,
JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO.
109-157, R. II(1), at 358 (2007).
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compensation we have a right to demand that they commit to putting
351
the public interest above their own for a short period. Allowing
resignation as a matter of right sends the message that House service
is a job like any other, a job that one takes because it suits one’s ends,
rather than a trust one holds to serve a greater good. In contrast,
when leaving the House is a matter of legislative grace, rather than
individual right, the message is sent that devotion to the public weal is
held above desire for personal gain. This, I suggest, is closer to our
aspirational conception of the House of Representatives. Indeed,
even though the Chiltern Hundreds is never denied today, it is still a
salutary fiction—or, put differently, a noble lie. Members of the
House of Commons do not resign; they simply accept a Crown office
incompatible with parliamentary service. They give up one form of
service in pursuit of another, rather than in pursuit of private ends.
This is a fiction, but an instructive one. We may well wish to tell a
similar story about ourselves in the United States: members may
leave only after the House, in which all Americans are represented on
terms of numerical equality, has determined that their departures are
352
not inimical to the commonweal.
But what of the represented? Would it not be in the public
interest to allow representatives to resign, rather than forcing them to
351. In support of his argument that the Thirteenth Amendment did not enact a blanket
prohibition on specific enforcement of employment contracts, Professor Oman has found that
“involuntary servitude” had four basic components in pre–Thirteenth Amendment caselaw: (1)
the contract was not freely entered into; (2) there was not bona fide consideration; (3) the
contract extended over a long period of time; and (4) the contract involved “complete
domination by the master of the servant, including the right to use violence to coerce the
servant.” Oman, supra note 346 (manuscript at 24–25). It should be apparent that a member’s
being obligated to remain in the House would not implicate any of these components.
352. It may fairly be asked why this principle of republican legitimacy should not be applied
to the Senate as well. The simplest answer—that the Constitution provides for resignations from
the Senate but not from the House—begs the question: we are trying to come up with a reason
why the House should be held to the republican principles, and if the similarly situated Senate is
not held to them, that might be evidence that the Constitution embodies no such principles. At
the Founding, the answer was that the Senate was not similarly situated. See supra Part III.B.
The Seventeenth Amendment made the houses more similarly situated, but term length may be
decisive here. Republican principles may suffice to oblige a member to serve out a two-year
term, but not a six-year term. There are good reasons, both ex post and ex ante, for this
distinction. Ex post, it may simply seem unfair to oblige senators to serve for over half a decade
against their will. After all, their circumstances may change dramatically and unforeseeably in
such a period, whereas circumstances are less likely to change significantly in a two-year period.
Ex ante, good candidates may simply be unwilling to sign up for a six-year commitment without
a guaranteed possibility of exit, whereas a two-year commitment is much less of a risk.
Therefore, allowing a right of resignation from the Senate as a general rule may increase the
caliber of the candidate pool enough to make it a good republican move.
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continue to represent their constituents unwillingly? Here, we have to
consider the alternative. Filling a vacancy takes a considerable
353
amount of time; moreover, many states do not fill House vacancies
354
created after a certain point in the congressional term, preferring to
leave them vacant until the next general election rather than spend
the money to hold a special election. It seems likely that even an
unwilling representative is preferable to no representative at all.
Moreover, it is, again, worth noting that this republican value
does not depend on any member’s actually being refused permission
to leave the House, and, again, it seems unlikely that members would
frequently be refused permission to leave. Rather, the value is in the
mere fact that members have to ask. In so doing, they reinforce both
the reality and the public perception of what a representative’s
relationship to the polity ought to be.
CONCLUSION
355

356

It is a long road from Sir Thomas Estcourt to Dennis Hastert.
This Article has sought to map that road, from the monarchical and
then republican conception that members of the House of Commons
had no individual right to leave their seats to the more liberal
conception that members of today’s House of Representatives can
leave their seats at will. This Article has used this historical map to
argue that the Constitution gives the House of Representatives the
power to refuse to allow members to resign, although the House has
never exercised that power. And finally, this Article has argued that
Congress has good reasons for ceasing to allow resignations as a
matter of right.
Doing so would constitute a turn toward a more republican
public political theory. It is certainly not the contention of this Article

353. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1773 (West 2008) (providing that the governor has up to
fourteen days after the occurrence of a House vacancy to issue a writ of election); CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 10703(a) (West 2007) (providing that a special election is to occur between 112 and 126
days after the governor issues the writ); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 54, § 140(a) (2008) (providing
that special elections to fill vacant House seats must occur between 145 and 160 days after the
creation of the vacancy).
354. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 54, § 140(b) (2008) (providing that no special election
will be called to fill a vacancy occurring after February 1 of an even-numbered year); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 26, § 12-101(b) (2008) (providing that no special election will be called to fill a vacancy
occurring after March 1 of an even-numbered year).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 14–20.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 334–35.

CHAFETZ.DOC

2008]

10/31/2008 1:22:57 PM

LEAVING THE HOUSE

235

that the American Constitution is a purely republican document, any
more than it is a purely liberal one. Rather, my contention here is
that, in the context of the relationship between legislators, legislative
houses, and the public, the pendulum has swung too far in the
direction of the individual members, and that a republican corrective
is in order. Republican theory understands the holding of public
office to be a trust, and those to whom the commonweal has been
entrusted ought not to be able lightly to put it down to pursue their
own private ends. Legislators who want to leave office before the end
of their term ought to be forced to tell their colleagues—and the
nation—why they wish to surrender the public trust and seek their
colleagues’ permission to do so. This rule, the rule envisioned by the
authors and ratifiers of the Constitution, would make it clear that
legislators exercise power in the people’s interest, not their own.
Certainly, a return to an older understanding of how members
leave the House of Representatives is not the only component of such
a republican corrective, and, indeed, I have elsewhere suggested other
357
components. This Article has focused on resignations from the
House, however, because this topic affords a clear view into how a
once-republican relationship became less so. The history allows us to
see what values were served by this conception of legislative service,
and it provides food for thought as to how those values can—and
whether they should—be assimilated to an, admittedly, more liberal
and less republican era. I have suggested in this Article ways in which
they both can and should.
We may no longer want actually to force members to serve
against their will by telling them, as the Commons told Estcourt, that
they have no right to prefer their own “will, or contentment” over
358
“the desire and satisfaction of the whole country.” But neither, I
submit, do we want our representatives simply to walk away,
cheerfully announcing that they do, in fact, prefer their own
contentment over the desire and satisfaction of the whole country—

357. See Josh Chafetz, Curing Congress’s Ills: Criminal Law as the Wrong Paradigm for
Congressional Ethics, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 238, 239–42 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/
2008/04/17/chafetz.html (arguing that congressional ethics enforcement should be understood as
aimed primarily at the maintenance of public trust, not at the detection and punishment of
wrongdoing); Chafetz, supra note 332, at 171–72 (recommending the creation of Congressional
Commissioners for Standards); Chafetz, supra note 327 (arguing that the houses of Congress
should use their inherent power to arrest and imprison their own members when those members
break house rules).
358. GLANVILLE, supra note 14, at 101.
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or, put differently, that they are “just done” with serving the common
359
interest, their two-year commitment notwithstanding. This Article’s
suggestions may, I hope, move us closer to an option more palatable
than either of those.

359.

See Congressional Sources, supra note 335.

